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Fire Control to Fire Management: A History of Policy and
Program in the National Park and Forest Service
Fire is an integral part of maintaining the ecological 
balance of our nation's parks and forests. Scientific 
studies have proven that fire has long been a force in 
determining the ecological composition of the North American 
continent. Both, Native Americans and early Euroamerican 
settlers used fire as a multipurpose tool in the areas which 
encompass today's national parks and forests. However, 
European man's ideal of fire as an ecological evil persisted 
well into this century.
After the creation of the first national parks and 
forests, fire suppression activity in these areas began in 
ernest, and did not cease until it was replaced by fire 
management which, due in part to the Wilderness Act of„-19W, 
allowed fire once again to play its natural role in newly 
created wilderness areas. This scenario is seen clearly in 
the fire histories of Yosemite, Sequoia, Kings Canyon and 
Yellowstone National Park, and Region One of the Forest 
Service.
The concept of fire management encountered its largest 
challenge following the Yellowstone fires of 1988. 
Fortunately, fire management objectives remained unchanged 
and only management guidelines for instituting programs and 
policies had to be revised.
Together, the history of fire suppression and fire 
management in theJNationa1 Park and Forest Service reflect 
man's changing ideals and knowledge concerning the natural 
environment, and his ongoing attempt to preserve the 
ecological integrity of our nation's wilderness in an ever 
changing world.
Director: Dan L. Flores
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INTRODUCTION
11. . . Behold, how great a matter
a little fire kindleth!"
James 3:5
Fire, like air and water, is an important ingredient in 
maintaining a healthy ecosystem in our nation's parks and 
forests. However, from the time Europeans first set foot on 
the North American continent, their idea of fire as evil has 
persisted until the present environmental movement. 
Subsequently, fire has been allowed to return to our 
nation's wilderness areas to play once again its natural 
role in determining the ecological composition of these 
lands.
Scientific studies regarding fire's role in the 
environment prove that for millions of years fire has been a 
force in determining the ecology of the North American 
continent.1 Human ignited burns have likewise been part of 
the environmental history of the landmass as aboriginal 
peoples have used fire as a multipurpose tool since their
*Junius 0. Baker, Jr. , "Wilderness Fire Management: 
Policy Development and Implementation" (M.S. thesis, Colorado 
State University, 1975), 3, and Clinton B. Phillips, "The
Relevance of Past Indian Fires to Current Fire Manager 
Programs," in USDAFS, Proceedings-Svmposium and Workshop on 
Wilderness Fire in Missoula. MT. November 15-18. 1983. General 
Technical Report INT-182, April 1985, 88.
arrival from Asia.2 As Euroamerican settlements spread 
across the country, the pioneers adopted many of the Native 
American burning practices.3
Once our national parks and forests were set aside from 
the public domain, fire suppression became the order of the 
day for management personnel. During the first half of the 
twentieth century, new policies and programs advanced the 
science of fire suppression. In time, suppression activity 
began to have a negative affect on the fauna of the nation's 
parks and forests. Fortunately, managers and research 
foresters in Yosemite, Sequoia, Kings Canyon and Yellowstone 
National Parks, and Region One of the Forest Service 
observed this trend and began incorporating prescribed 
natural fires and prescribed burns4 into their new 
management mission as put forth by the Wilderness Act.5 
Fire suppression had yielded to fire management.
2Stephen F. Arno, "Ecological Effects and Management 
Implications of Indian Fires," in Symposium and Workshop on 
Wilderness Fire. 81.
3John L. Vankat, "Fire and Man in Sequoia National Park," 
Annals of the Association of American Geographers 67, no.l 
(March 1977): 17, and Stephen J. Pyne, Fire in America: A
Cultural History of Wildland and Rural Fire (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1982), 101.
4Prescribed natural fires are "fires ignited by lightning 
or other natural forces (volcanoes) [which] are permitted to 
burn under prescribed conditions," and prescribed burns are 
"fires ignited by trained professionals under prescribed 
conditions." USDAFS, Symposium and Workshop on Wilderness 
Fire. foreword.
5U .S., Statutes at Large. 78: 8 9 0-96.
Fire management activity progressed steadily until the 
historic 1988 fire season in the Greater Yellowstone Area. 
The fires raged across park and forest service land and 
threatened the continuation of fire management practices in 
both departments. After careful review of the fire policies 
and programs of the two agencies, fire management plans were 
revised to include new management criteria. Between 1990 
and 1992, both services had again begun using fire as an 
ecological tool in compliance with their wilderness 
management objectives.
Together, the history of fire suppression and fire 
management in the National Park and Forest Service reflect 
man's changing ideals and knowledge concerning the natural 
environment, and his ongoing attempt to preserve the 
ecological integrity of our nation's wilderness in an ever 
changing world.
CHAPTER I
NATIVE AMERICANS AND FIRE
Fire, either naturally ignited or human caused, has 
been a key determinant in the ecological composition of 
vegetation on the North American continent. It is 
impossible to tell for certain how long fire has blazed 
across the present day United States. Scientists have 
discovered a fossil charcoal called fusian "in coal deposits 
dating to the Mesozoic Era which ended over 80 million years 
ago."1 Study of these deposits have lead paleogeologists to 
believe that the fusian samples originated from forest and 
grass fires. It is most likely that these fires were 
ignited by lightning, volcanic eruptions, or "friction from 
falling rocks."2 However, whether these fires played an 
important role in determining the ecological characteristics 
of vegetation on the continent at the time cannot be known. 
The earliest evidence of "fire-adapted ecosystems" 
scientists have discovered is from the geological record 
dating to the Miocene Epoch of the Tertiary Period thirteen 
million years ago.3 These fires, too, were started by 
natural phenomena. Humans did not become an additional
’Baker, "Wilderness Fire Management," 3.
2Ibid.
3Phillips, "The Relevance of Past Indian Fires," 88
ignition source on the North American continent until they 
crossed the Alaskan land bridge over 12,000 years ago.
Native American fire had a "widespread influence" on 
the floral species of central and western North America up 
to the time of European settlement around the mid- to late- 
1800s.4 Their use of fire altered many natural ecosystems 
and performed an important role in "opening the forests and 
expanding the grasslands."5 Since the majority of this 
thesis will focus on the forests of the Northwest, 
specifically those in Montana, this section will deal mainly 
with Native American fire practices in the state. However,
I must also incorporate the burning habits of the Sierra 
Nevada tribes so that Park Service fire management policies 
and programs can be fully understood.
Burning Practices of Native Americans
To date there have been several historical, 
ethnographical, and oral history studies undertaken to 
surmise the most common practices in which Native Americans 
used fire. Thirteen such applications have been documented: 
improvement of hunting, forest protection (which I will
4Arno, "Ecological Effects and Management Implications of 
Indian Fires," 81.
5Phillips, "The Relevance of Past Indian Fires," 87.
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incorporate with the third objective-insect control), 
enhancement of certain plant species, campsite clearing, 
agricultural land clearing, trail clearing, communication, 
rituals and entertainment, warfare, sanitation, improvement 
of horse grazing, and unintentional fire.6
Many Indian tribes used fire for hunting. "At night 
torches spotlighted deer and drew fish close to canoes to be 
speared. Smoke flushed bees from their hives, raccoons out 
of their dens, and bears out their caves."7 Natives also 
employed a "fire-ring hunting technique." This type of fire 
burned toward the center of a specified area, thus forcing 
all the game within the fire's boundaries to be driven from 
the circle into the sights of waiting tribal huntsmen.8 Any 
broadcast burning9 that the native peoples did had a 
positive effect on future hunting. As the fire historian
6Sandi Morris, "Wildfire as a Part of Cultural Prehistory 
in Montana and the Implications for Public Land Managers," 
Archeology in Montana 33, no. 1 (1992): 82-85.
7Stephen J. Pyne, "Indian Fires: The Fire Practice of
North American Indians Transformed Large Areas from Forest to 
Grassland," Natural History 2 (February 1983): 8.
8Calvin Martin, "Fire and Forest Structure in the 
Aboriginal Eastern Forest," The Indian Historian 6 (Fall 
1973): 40-41.
9A broadcast burn is "intentional burning of debris on a 
designated unit of land, where the fuel has not been piled or 
windrowed, by allowing fire to spread freely over the entire 
area." John D. Walsted, Steven R. Radosevich and David V. 
Sandberg, eds., Natural and Prescribed Fire in Pacific 
Northwest Forests (Corvallis: Oregon State University Press,
1990), 302.
Stephen Pyne noted, all Indians recognized "that new grass 
sprouting on a freshly burned site would attract grazers by 
its superior palatability . . .[Hence, they] placed snare
traps on small burned plots— in effect, baiting the trap 
with fired grass."10
Protecting the forest also meant insect control in many 
native communities. Large fires could cause devastating 
destruction to the forest if they became wild fires and 
burned in areas where heavy undergrowth and downed trees 
proliferated. For this reason some tribes ignited certain 
areas during the appropriate time of year (different times 
in assorted geographic locations) to insure that the 
undergrowth did not accumulate. The fires also served to 
prevent insect and disease epidemics.11 For example, in 
California, native tribes "used smoke to drive off the 
mistletoe that invaded mesquite and oak."12
Many Native American hunter-gatherer tribes depended 
more on gathering than they did on hunting. For this 
reason, many tribes employed localized fire to enhance 
edible plant species. This type of fire was restricted to 
low elevation areas in which natural berries grew in 
abundance. Fires cleared away the excess underbrush and
10Pyne, "Indian Fires," 8.
"Morris, "Wildfire as a Part of Cultural Prehistory in 
Montana," 83.
12Pyne, "Indian Fire," 8.
allowed the berry-producing species to prosper.13
Clearing a campsite prior to pitching a tepee and 
starting a fire for cooking and warmth provided a measure of 
safety in the native community. Other reasons for this 
burning were to enhance visibility and clear away pestilent 
insects.14
Agricultural land clearing involved more than just 
burning to increase the production of edible wild plants: it 
also allowed for the clearing of land to cultivate 
domesticated plant types.15 Not only did the fire clear the 
land but it replaced lost soil nutrients which had been 
extracted by the previous season's crop. This practice was 
described by Lewis Henry Morgan in his journal during his 
expedition to the Rocky Mountains in May, June and July of 
1862. Upon the arrival of the Crow Indians at the ground 
they planned to cultivate, they ’’first collect[ed] wood or 
sticks the size of the finger and lay[ed] it on the old 
garden beds and the whole is burnt over."16
Hunter-gatherer societies depended upon trails to allow 
them to follow game swiftly and move from one area to the
13Stephen W. Barrett, "Indians and Fire," Western 
Wildlands 6 (Spring 1980): 19.
14Morris, "Wildfire as a Part of Cultural Prehistory in 
Montana," 84.
15Pyne, "Indian Fires," 7.
16Leslie A. White, ed., Lewis Henry Morgan: The Indian
Journals, 1859-62 (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan
Press, 1959), 190.
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next in search of edible indigenous plant species. For this 
purpose aboriginal peoples employed broadcast fire.17
Tribal members did communicate with smoke, but not with 
the elaborate signals which many believe are the product of 
small fires and blankets. Signal-fires were large so they 
could be seen for long distances. "Thus, communication 
fires certainly had the potential to affect forest 
ecosystems. However, since they were often ignited at high 
altitudes, signal-fires may not have consumed large acreages 
or burned for long periods."18
Native Americans used fire for rituals and 
entertainment. Spiritual cleansing to many tribes involved 
allowing smoke to cover the entire person and carry away any 
evil spirits.19 Tribes also believed that smoke from the 
fires would induce rain from the sky20 or insure fair
weather for a journey.21
As European expansion extended deeper and deeper into 
the western regions of North America, Indians used fire in
warfare not only against hostile tribes, but white explorers
and settlers as well. Most tribes used broadcast fire "both
17Ibid. , 8 .
18Barrett, "Indian Fires," 19.
19Pyne, "Indian Fires," 8.
20Morris, "Wildfire as a Part of Cultural Prehistory in 
Montana," 85.
2IPyne, "Indian Fires," 8.
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as a tactical weapon and as a strategic scorched-earth 
policy."22 Fire used in this fashion often proved deadly 
because a strong wind could drive a fire faster than an 
enemy might escape.23 Native Americans also used blazes to 
destroy specific objectives such as planted fields and 
grazing grounds.24 During his travels, Morgan also noted 
that "Indians have strict laws against firing the prairies 
in their hunting ranges [during hunting season] as it drives 
the buffalo out of their country. [But,] a hostile 
neighboring nation often fire the prairies for this 
purpose."25 Of course this fire could escape and destroy 
more than the intended target.
Sanitation may have been the least common use of fire 
among Native Americans. One archeologist, the only 
reference I located that alluded to this application of 
fire, "speculated that Indians burned the refuse at the base 
of a buffalo jump when the stench and flies became too 
intolerable. "26
Utilization of fire to improve grazing areas for horses
22Ibid.
23George E. Gruell, "Indian Fires in the Interior West: 
A Widespread Influence," in Symposium and Workshop on 
Wilderness Fire. 71.
24Martin, "Fire and Forest Structure," 40.
25White, Lewis Henry Morgan. 151.
26Morris, "Wildfire as a Part of Cultural Prehistory in 
Montana," 85.
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did not begin until after the acquisition of horses around 
1700. A large number of horses frequently grazing in a 
small expanse of land quickly depleted the natural 
vegetation. Burning grazing fields every three-to-five 
years replenished the soil with nutrients to ensure the 
continuance of feed.27
At times accidental or unintentional fires had 
widespread influence on the natural environment. At any 
time, fire, being employed to achieve any of the objectives 
above could have escaped the user, either by sparking or 
high wind, and cause a considerably larger blaze than 
intended. Camp fires and signal fires were a major cause of 
unintentional fires. Indians commonly used a downed tree 
for these purposes, and because many times they were 
travelling on another tribe's land, they left the tree to 
burn for days.28
Specific Native American tribes used burning to achieve 
/ a variety of these objectives, but not every tribe employed 
fire in the same fashion. Thus, the different tribal 
burning patterns modified many natural ecosystems in a
 ̂ unique manner. For the purposes of this paper, I will now
examine the specific burning practices of the Indians in the 
Sierra Nevada and western Montana to determine their 
influences on the environment prior to the settlement of
27Barrett, "Indians and Fire," 21.
28Pyne, "Indian Fires," 7.
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Euroamer icans.29
Native American Fire and the Sierra Nevada Mountains
Before settlement of the Sierra Nevada by 
Euroamericans, about 1850, fire had been widespread and 
frequent (on the average of two-to-eight years) in the 
Sierra Nevada. Many conflagrations were deliberately 
started by Native Americans as well as naturally by 
lightning.30 Since these fires were recurrent, they 
provided little opportunity for the build up of undergrowth 
before another fire would consume it. "As a result, the 
fires were light and 'friendly.'"31 The forty-niners who 
kept journals as they ventured into this area noted the 
landscape in which the Giant Sequoias flourished.
29The national parks of the Sierra Nevada lead the way in 
utilizing prescribed natural fire and prescribed burning in 
their fire management plans. The parks began experimenting 
with these types of fire in the late-1950s and began 
"official" use of fire according to stated wilderness 
management objectives in 1968. Yellowstone did not begin its 
fire management program until 1972. Also, Region One of the 
Forest Service, which constitutes the national forests in 
western Montana, was the first region to use prescribed 
natural fire in any Forest Service wilderness area. Both Park 
and Forest Service fire histories will be discussed in detail 
in later chapters.
30Harold H. Biswell, "Forest Fire in Perspective," Tall 
Timbers Fire Ecology Conference Proceedings in California, 
November 9-10. 1967, no. 7 (Tallahassee: TTRS, 1968), 44-45.
31Harold H. Biswell, "The Big Trees and Fire," National 
Park Magazine 3 5 (April 19 61): 11.
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[They] spoke almost to the man of the wide-spaced 
columns of mature trees that grew on the lower western 
slope in gigantic magnificence. The ground was a 
grass parkland, in springtime carpeted with flowers. 
Deer and bears were abundant.32
This condition was undoubtedly a result of recurrent burning
by Native Americans and unsuppressed lightning-caused fires.
Let us now examine the burning habits of the tribes in the
region and the scientific evidence which confirm this
declaration.
In a paper read before the National Forestry Congress 
in 1887, Joaquin Miller, who grew up among the Indians of 
Yosemite Valley, related their burning practices prior to 
discovery by Euroamericans. He stated:
It was my fate to spend my boyhood with Indians. 
They were the only true foresters I ever knew. in the 
spring, after the leaves and grasses had served their 
time and the season in holding back the floods and 
warming and nourishing the earth, then would the old 
squaws begin to look above for the little dry spot of 
headland and sunny valley. And as fast as dry spots 
appeared they would be burned.
In this way the fire was always under control. In 
this way the fire was always the servant, never the 
master. And by the time the floods came again there 
was another coat of grass and leaves stronger and 
better than the one before, because of the careful and 
temperate fire of the careful and wise old women. By 
this means the Indians always kept their forest open, 
pure, and fruitful and conflagrations were unknown.33
32A.S Leopold, S.A. Cain, C.M. Cottam. In.N. Gabrielson 
and T.L. Kimball. "Study of Wildlife Problems in the National 
Parks: Wildlife Management in the National Parks."
Transactions of the North American Wildlife National Resource 
Conference 28 (1963): 33.
33Biennial Report of the Commissioners to Manage Yosemite 
Valiev and the Mariposa Big Tree Grove. For the Years 1889-90 
(Sacramento: State Printing Office, 1892), 14.
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Scientific investigations support this statement. By 
counting the growth rings and examining the fire-scars of 
trees researchers can date fires centuries after they 
occurred. This "fire-scar" method of dating has been 
employed to determine the fire history of the Giant 
Sequoias. Using this method of dating, foresters have 
discovered that fires occurred at two-to-eight year 
intervals in the sequoia forest and the mixed-conifer 
forests of the area.34
According to anthropological evidence, aboriginal 
settlement in the areas of the present national parks in the 
Sierra Nevada began about 1000 A.D.35 Anthropologists feel 
"that Indian burning may have occurred for roughly a 
thousand years in the ponderosa pine-mixed conifer forests 
of the California Sierra Nevada.”36 It has also been 
determined that "a history of frequent fires extended back 
at least 1,100 years in an area of the California redwood 
forest.1,37
Scientists disagree regarding the frequency of 
lightning- caused fire in the Sierra Nevada. One suggests 
that lightning fires occur at an average of one hundred per
34Biswell, "Forest Fire in Perspective,"44.
35Vankat, "Fire and Man," 17.
36Arno, "Ecological Effects and Management Implications of 
Indian Fires," 81.
37Ibid.
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year across the range,38 while others assert that 11 lightning 
fires are uncommon in that [Giant Sequoia forest] area."39
Despite the occurrence of lightning-caused fires in the 
area, the fact that Native Americans used fire in the region 
"as an ecological tool to carefully promote their welfare 
while preserving that of their natural environment"40 must 
account at least partly for the clean, open, and "park-like" 
conditions in which the early western pioneers found the 
sequoia groves and mixed-conifer forests of the Sierra 
Nevada.
Native American Fire in Montana and the Yellowstone Region
Like the fires that burned in the Sierra Nevada prior 
to the settlement of Euroamericans, the state of present day 
Montana and Yellowstone National Park were subjected to 
natural and human caused conflagrations. To get an idea of 
the frequency and ecological effects these fires had on the 
environment, I will again examine the scientific evidence 
and augment these findings with journal entries of early 
explorers that describe aboriginal fire practices firsthand.
38Biswell, "Forest Fire in Perspective," 45.
39Arno, "Ecological Effects and Management Implications of 
Indian Fires," 81.
40Martin, "Fire and Forest Structure," 41.
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Sandi Morris, a scientist who studied Indian burning 
habits of the northwestern plains Indians, found that one 
tribe or another used fire to achieve one or more of the 
thirteen objectives previously mentioned. She maintains 
that even though the study "area much exceeds the boundaries 
of the state of Montana, . . .  it should provide information 
relevant to the fire uses practiced by native Americans 
living in Montana."41
Another study conducted to determine the fire-use 
customs of Montana Indian tribes concentrated on the 
indigenous peoples of western Montana and northeastern 
Idaho. The tribes included the Flatheads, Pend d'Oreilles, 
Kootenais, and Salish. The study area constituted the 
majority of forest land in present day Region One of the 
United States Forest Service. Barrett found that "fires 
were primarily set in valley-bottom grasslands and lower- 
elevation forests dominated by ponderosa pine, Douglas-fir 
or western larch. Although relatively rare, some Indian 
fires occurred in high-elevation forests."42
In an effort to determine fire history of the 
Bitterroot Mountains, the Mehringer study analyzed charcoal 
fragments found in pollen sediment samples collected from 
the Lost Trail Pass Bog at the head of the Bitterroot
41Morris, "Wildfire 'as a Part of Cultural Prehistory in 
Montana," 79.
42Barrett, "Indians and Fire," 18.
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Valley. The study found that
more charcoal was incorporated in the sediments during 
the last 2000 yr than during the preceding 9500 yr. . .
[However,] the increase in charcoal is not accompanied 
by evidence for an equally drastic change in 
vegetation.43
Thus, the members of the study concluded that "perhaps 
changing patterns of aboriginal land-use and resource 
management were contributing factors" in producing the 
increase of charcoal fragments.44
Another study conducted by Stephen F. Arno, a Forest 
Service Scientist, has employed the fire-scar dating 
technique to assemble a fire history of the Northern 
Rockies. Examining the quantity, species, and size of the 
surviving trees, Arno made a number of conclusions about the 
"nature" of early fires in several study areas in the 
Northwest. In this area of the country, "datable" scars 
from numerous fires on a tree's growth rings can be read as 
far back as 300 years.45
For instance, using this dating method in the north 
Bitterroot Valley, Arno found that fire-scars dating to 1500 
"seem to represent unusually short fire-free intervals for 
the northern Rockies" estimated by the recorded number of
43Peter J. Mehringer, Jr., Stephen F. Arno and Kenneth L. 
Peterson, "Postglacial History of Lost Trail Pass Bog, 
Bitterroot Mountains, Montana," Arctic and Alpine Research 9, 
no.4 (1977): 364, 367.
“ ibid., 366.
45Stephen F. Arno, "Forest Fire History in the Northern 
Rockies," Journal of Forestry 78 (August 1980): 460.
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lightning caused fires in recent history. (Lightning caused
fires have occurred at longer time intervals in the last
eighty years, than the average fire-free periods over
century ago.) He attributed this to frequently set Indian
fires in the area.46
Arno concluded that these studies "reveal that in some
forest types fire maintained many-aged open stands of serai
trees. In other types, major fires caused replacement of
the stands. Often, however, fires burned at variable
intensities, creating a mosaic of stands differing in
comparison and structure."47 Thus, this mosaic was created
and maintained by natural and Native American fire.
One other study conducted in western Montana, which
also employed the fire-scar dating procedure, found results
analogous to Arno's. Stephen W. Barrett, also a research
forester, conducted this study to determine the fire history
in lower elevation (2,000 - 6,000 ft.) ponderosa
pine/Douglas-fir forests of western Montana. Barrett
concluded that
overall, the results . . . suggested that Indian fires
were very influential in modifying grasslands and 
lower-elevation forests in habitation zones. Lightning 
and Indians created a pattern of frequent, usually low- 
intensity ground fires, and this pattern was in effect 
for at least 400 years before the 1880s, perhaps as far
46Ibid. , 41-42.
47Ibid. , 40.
19
back as 2,000 years ago.48
The journals of early western explorers can give some
idea of the ways Indians used fire in Montana. Lewis and
Clark noted Native American fire habits in their exploration
of the state in 1805 and 1806. As the party travelled
westward through the Beaverhead Valley, Lewis made reference
to the fire practices of the Indians of the area. Friday,
August 23, 1805:
I . . . laid up the canoes this morning in a pond near
the forks; sunk them in the water and weighted them 
down with stone, . . . hoping by this means to guard
against both the effects of high water, and that of the 
fire which is frequently kindled in these plains by the 
natives.49
Near the Lemhi River, Clark described signal fires set by
the Salish Indians. Saturday, August 31, 1805:
This day warm and Sultry, Praires or open Valies on 
fire in Several places-- The Countrey is Set on fire 
for the purpose of Collecting the different band . . .
Clark again made note of native fire use in his journal
while the expedition was camped near Lolo Pass on their
return voyage. Wednesday, June 25, 1806:
last evening the indians entertained us with setting 
the fir trees on fire. they have a great number of dry 
limbs near their bodies which when Set on fire create a
48Stephen W. Barrett, "Relationship of Indian-Caused Fires 
to the Ecology of Western Montana Forests,” (M.S. thesis, 
University of Montana, 1977), 123.
49Gary E. Moulton, ed., The Journals of the Lewis and 
Clark Expedition. Volume 5. July 28-November 1. 1805
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1988), 148.
50Ibid. , 179.
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very sudden and eminence blaize from bottom to top of 
those tall trees. they are a beutifull object in this 
situation at night. this exhibition remi[n]de[d] me of 
a display of firewo[r]ks. the nativs told us that 
their object in Setting those trees on fire was to 
bring fair weather for our journey.51
During a voyage in 1810, Thomas James, an early western
trapper, described the "park-like" conditions of the land
bordering the Missouri River in the Rocky Mountains.
The cotton wood trees seemed to have been planted by 
the hand of a man on the bank of the river to shade our 
way, and the pines and cedars waved their tall, 
majestic heads along the base and on the sides of the 
mountains. The whole landscape was that of the most 
splendid English Park.52
James did not attribute these conditions to Indian burning,
but either natural or human-ignited fires must have occurred
frequently to have created the above landscape.
In 1851 the artist Rudolph Kurz wrote, after an
adventure on the Missouri River, that
the only service the Indians render for the benefit of 
the [buffalo] herds is to burn the dried grass every 
spring in order that the young crop will be more 
abundant.53
51Gary E. Moulton, ed., The Journals of the Lewis and 
Clark Expedition, Volume 8. June 10-September 26. 1806
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1993), 50.
52Fred R. Gowans, A Fur Trade History of Yellowstone Park 
(Orem, Utah: Mountain Grizzly Publications, 1989), 76.
53J,N.B. Hewitt, ed. , The Journal of Rudolph Friederich 
Kurz— Life and Work of a Swiss Artist, trans. Myrtis Jarrell 
(Fairfield, Washington: Ye Galleon Press, 1969), 229. It is
not known where along the Missouri Kurz viewed this practice, 
but it is safe to say that tribes of Native Americans which 
inhabited the stretches of the river (including the portion in 
Montana) would have shared common burning practices in regards 
to buffalo hunting.
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By these accounts and the scientific evidence formerly
presented, it is clear that the burning tendencies of the
Native Americans tribes which inhabited Montana and the
Northwest worked in concert with natural phenomena to
produce the floral patterns which early Euroamericans
discovered upon their exploration and settlement of the
state and region.
Like the Sierra Nevada and the Montana territory, the
Yellowstone region was also subject to aboriginal fire. As
Alston Chase related, "recent research has established that
the Indian practice of burning around Yellowstone was not
only widespread, but had been practiced for millennia.54"
Firsthand accounts relate some of the Native American's
burning practices in the area.
In August 1834, while camping along the banks of the
Madison River in Yellowstone, Osborne Russell and his
trapping party were attacked by a band of Blackfeet Indians.
Russell wrote in his journal that the party
lay almost silently about 3 hours when finding they 
could not arouse us to action by their long shots they 
commenced setting fire to the dry grass and rubbish 
with which we were surrounded: the wind blowing brisk
from the South in a few moments the fire was converted 
into one circle of flame and smoke which united over 
our heads.55
54Alston Chase, Playing God in Yellowstone:_____The
Destruction of America's First National Park (San Diego: 
Harcourt, Brace and Jovanovich, 1987), 96.
550sborne Russell, Journal of a Trapper, ed. Aubrey L. 
Haines (1955; reprint, Lincoln: University of Nebraska
Press, 1965), 30.
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During the Washburn Expedition to Yellowstone in 1870, 
the party did mention "plenty of Indian 'signs,'" but it did 
not report any specific references to indigenous burning 
practices. However, "from the head of a coulee," the 
expedition travelled "through fallen timber" which covered 
"a burnt and rocky road."56 It seems probable, from past 
information, that the native peoples of the area set fire to 
the trail to ease transportation through the area.
Even as late as 1886 the Acting Superintendent of the 
park, D.W. Wear, reported that "a group of Lemhi Indians (a 
Shoshone tribe), set two fires in the western part of the 
park.57" There is no reason given for these fires which 
could have been set for any number of objectives.
As the above information demonstrates, Native Americans 
in Montana and the Yellowstone region utilized fire for many 
reasons. Regardless of the intended purposes of these 
fires, together they functioned as a determining factor in 
producing the landscape of the territory as first viewed by 
Euroamericans.
Implications for Federal Fire Policy
56Nathaniel P. Langford, Diary of the Washburn Expedition 
to the Yellowstone and Firehole Rivers in the Year 1870 
(N.p.: Nathaniel Pitt Langford, 1905), 14-15.
57Chase, Playing God in Yellowstone. 96.
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As evidenced by the preceding information, aboriginal
fires had a widespread influence on the vegetation of the
Sierra Nevada and the northwest United States. Their use of
fire opened up the forests and expanded the grasslands.
Regardless of whether or not fires were started purposefully
or not; together, natural and Native American fire created
and maintained a healthy and different forest ecosystem.
The history of the Park and Forest Service, in the
context of fire, can be viewed as a battle between humans
and nature. After eighty years of fire suppression in the
Park Service and over sixty years in the Forest Service,
fire managers are now striving to return wilderness areas
under their control back to the "natural" condition, or at
least the conditions as viewed by the first Euroamericans.
With the changing attitudes regarding fire and the
environment, Stephen Pyne wrote that:
As a child of nature, the American Indian could not 
have deliberately damaged his environment, and by mid­
century fire was generally considered an environmental 
evil. In more contemporary times, when prescribed fire 
has again been accepted as an appropriate tool in the 
management of natural systems, it has been discovered 
that, indeed, the Indians burned.58
Together, natural fire and Indian land-use practices 
created a landscape which was more "park-like" and 
biotically diverse than that which resulted from 
Euroamerican fire use and suppression. Thus, it is 
important for fire managers to understand the fire histories
58Pyne, Fire in America. 81.
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of their respective forests so they may employ fire in 
wilderness to recreate, what we Americans today long for, a 
romantic "vignette of primitive America."
CHAPTER II
FIRE POLICY AND PROGRAM IN THE PARK SERVICE
Today, the symbol of Smokey the Bear as protector of 
our nation's parks and forests is well known. Since 1945, 
thanks to the National Cooperative Fire Prevention Program, 
Smokey has stood at the entrances to our national parks as 
if to say, "keep fire out of these beautiful areas, it will 
destroy the natural splendor." This is a cultural message 
because in reality fire is an important component in the 
ecological balance of the environment.
Before the Euroamericans entered the terrain the 
national parks currently occupy, fire had long played a role 
in shaping the landscape. Like the Indians, early American 
settlers and pioneers utilized fire to clear the land for 
raising crops and livestock.1 Before the creation of the 
first national park, Yellowstone in 1872, fire had earned a 
reputation as an awesome destructive force, one that needed 
to be controlled and contained in any way possible. The 
only beneficial use of fire was believed to be for 
expansion, clearing land, or capitalistic purposes, insuring 
healthy trees for harvest and fertilizer for new pasture. 
This idea was instinctively carried over to the 
administrative policies of the national parks in the late
‘This idea is superbly documented intermittently 
throughout Pyne, Fire in America.
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nineteenth century. In 1886 the U.S. Cavalry took over 
administration of Yellowstone National Park from its 
appointed civilian supervisor. The Cavalry would manage the 
national parks (Yellowstone, Yosemite, Sequoia, and General 
Grant, later to be included in Kings Canyon in 1940) until 
the newly created National Park Service, formed in 1916, 
began operating in 1918.2 The Park Service continued a 
policy of fire suppression until 1968. In 1963 the Leopold 
Report was published recommending that national parks should 
"represent a vignette of primitive America."3 This meant 
the restoration of fire to the ecological activity in the 
parks. Prescribed natural fire (PNF), and prescribed burns 
(PB) would enable park superintendents to meet the 
managerial directives stated in the Wilderness 
Recommendations of each park. Some of the first parks to 
incorporate PNF into their management plans were Yosemite, 
Sequoia, and Kings Canyon in 1968 (Grand Teton and Wind Cave 
National Parks are the other parks which incorporated PNF in 
1968) .4 Yellowstone followed suit in 1972 .5 Fire history
2H. Duane Hampton, How the U. S. Cavalry Saved Our 
National Parks (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1971), 
82, 118.
3Leopold, A.S. et al., "Study of Wildlife Problems in the 
National Parks," 32.
4Bruce M. Kilgore, "Fire Management in the National 
Parks: An Overview," in Tall Timbers Fire Ecology Conference
Proceedings in Missoula. MT. October 8-10. 1983. no.14
(Tallahassee: TTRS, 1975), 54.
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in these four parks will be the focus of this chapter.6
Pre-1890 Euroamerican Fire in the 
Sierra Nevada and Yellowstone
Like Native Americans, early Euroamerican settlers in 
the West also utilized human ignited fire in areas which 
would subsequently become national parks. With the forced 
removal of Native Americans from the Sierra Nevada, it 
became a summer grazing ground for livestock raised by 
pioneers. The first "ranchers” were of Spanish ancestry and 
came from Mexico. The Spanish brought with them "their 
cattle and sheep, their horses and mules, and with them 
brought their camp followers, the weedy plants that had 
followed them halfway around the world."7 Their range 
management techniques devastated the countryside. The 
needle grasses, wild rye, June grass, bluegrass and poppies 
perished. These native species were replaced by 
Mediterranean plants such as foxtail, Medusa's head, poverty
5Don G. Despain and Robert E. Sellers, "Natural Fire In 
Yellowstone National Park," Western Wildlands 4 (Summer 
1977): 21.
6Due to the enormous size of the Yellowstone fires of 
1988, the number of agencies brought together to fight the 
fire, and the many national implications concerning fire in 
wilderness which resulted from the blaze, I will deal 
separately with the Yellowstone burn in Chapter IV.
7Raymond F. Dasmann, The Destruction of California (New 
York: The Macmillan Company, 1965), 59.
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grass, tarweed, and thistle. The grazing animals left the 
range dry and barren causing extreme erosion every time 
heavy rains fell.8
However ecologically devastating the practice of 
grazing sheep and cattle by the Spanish in California proved 
to be, "herders also commonly set fires when driving 
livestock out of the mountains in the fall of the year." 
These fires continued to keep the proliferation of 
undergrowth modest and promote the growth of new grass for 
grazing in the spring.9 Farmers also used fire to clear 
valleys for agriculture, and timber owners embraced it as a 
means of reducing fuel levels among mature timber stands.10
Euroamerican-ignited fires were not as prevalent in the 
Yellowstone region due to the fact that the environment was 
not an ideal locale for human habitation or frequent fire. 
The elevations in the park range from 5,000 to over 11,000 
feet, the average temperature at the center of the park is 
only 55.2 degrees Fahrenheit in July and for January it is 
10.7 degrees Fahrenheit. Thus, "the climate in Yellowstone 
Park is characterized by long, cold winters; short, cool 
summers; and a resultant short growing season."11 However,
8Ibid., 59-71.
9Vankat, "Fire and Man in Sequoia National Park," 20.
10Pyne, Fire in America. 101.
nRobert E. Sellers and Don G. Despain, "Fire Management 
in Yellowstone National Park," Tall Timbers Fire Ecology 
Conference Proceedings in Missoula. MT, October 8-10, 1974.
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mountain men inevitably used fire, as the Indians did, in 
the hunting of game.
With the contemporary recognition of Native American 
and lightning fires, it is obvious that the burning done by 
the farmers and herders was "an extension of the practice of 
the Indians. Indeed, the two cultures burned for much the 
same reasons— to favor certain plant species and to open the 
forests.1,12
The noted naturalist John Muir wrote in 1878 that 
"fire, the great destroyer of Sequoia, also furnishes bare, 
virgin ground, one of the conditions essential for its 
growth from seed."13 Muir recognized the regenerative power 
of fire in the forest, but at the same time he labeled fire 
as a destructive force. The two sides of the "suppress all 
fires" v. "let it burn" debate had been drawn. It would 
take scientists and park officials ninety years to allow 
fire once again to play its natural role in the national 
parks.
The Cavalry and the National Parks
no.14 (Tallahassee: TTRS, 1975), 99-100.
l2Vankat, "Fire and Man," 21.
13R.J. Hartesveldt and H.T. Harvey, "The Fire Ecology of 
Sequoia Regeneration," in Tall Timbers Fire Ecology Conference 
Proceedings in California. November 9-10. 1967, no. 6
(Tallahassee: TTRS, 1968), 65.
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Yosemite was ceded to the state of California by the 
federal government in 1864 as a state park. In 1872, 
Yellowstone became the first national park. Following 
Yellowstone, Yosemite, Sequoia and General Grant were added 
to the National Park System in 1890.
Prior to 1886, the national parks were administered by 
civilian appointees. There was no concrete policy 
pertaining to fire management. At the turn of the century 
biological sciences were not fully developed. Scientists 
did not pay much, if any, attention to the continual cause 
and effect relationships acting themselves out in the 
natural world. Instead, researchers were more concerned 
with cataloging data in field manuals. Thus, the only 
people to understand fire's relationship to the "tall trees" 
were the local Native Americans.14
In 1884, a Special House Committee, charged with 
investigating the affairs of Yellowstone, agreed that "the 
most important duty of the 'superintendent and assistants in 
the Park is to protect the forests from fire and ax.'"15 
At the time, any destructive force in the park, be it nature 
or human induced, was considered an environmental evil.
Thus, when the U.S. Cavalry assumed control of Yellowstone
14Alfred Runte, National Parks: The American Experience. 
2d ed., rev. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1987), 
201.
15House Report 1076, 49th Cong., 1st Sess., Vol.4 (SN 
2438): liv., quoted in Hampton, U.S. Cavalry. 72.
in 1886, a near hundred year legacy of fire suppression was 
begun. Administration of Yellowstone, Yosemite, General 
Grant, and Sequoia National Parks would be the Cavalry's 
duty until 1918. The Cavalry operated under the "policy of 
suppressing all fires in all parks. . . Unfortunately, this
was based on the idea that all fires are an unnatural 
process in the forests."16 One of the first duties 
undertaken by Captain Moses Harris, the first military 
superintendent of Yellowstone, was to extinguish the fires 
that were currently burning in the park upon his arrival.17 
In 1894, the then Acting Superintendent of the park, George 
S. Anderson, found that with an ever-increasing number of 
visitors, it was paramount to augment the number of fire 
patrols "to protect the forest from destruction."18
Not all of the U.S. Calvary officers believed in a 
policy of suppressing every fire. This is primarily notable 
in Yosemite National Park. Captain G.H.G. Gale reported to 
the Secretary of the Interior in 1894 that "examination of 
this subject leads me to believe that the absolute 
prevention of fires in these mountains will eventually lead 
to a disastrous result." Seasonal fires remove the buildup 
of fallen trees and seedlings from the forest floor,
16Agee, "Fire Management," 80.
17Hampton, U.S. Cavalry. 83.
,8Ibid. , 107.
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preparing "the ground. . . for next years growth."19 (A
light fire would not harm the giant sequoias because they 
were protected by an "asbestos-like bark." Only severe 
fires, those resulting from a buildup of ground fuels, would 
seriously affect the trees.)20 Subsequent acting 
superintendents noted the necessity of fire for the well­
being of the groves. These opinions were based on fires 
that had been suppressed but, before suppression was 
complete, enough acreage was thoroughly burned to permit the 
acreage to return to a "park like" condition. The acting 
superintendents also noticed that fire did not have an 
adverse effect on the sequoias. However, like the report 
written by Gale, their recommendations fell on deaf ears.
In 1904, a small area of General Grant National Park 
was intentionally burned to remove the "coniferous rubbish" 
accumulating on the forest floor. This is believed to be the 
earliest mention of this type of use of fire by park 
management, and it would be the last mention of "prescribed 
burning" in the Sierra Nevada parks for sixty odd years.21
19USDI, Report of the Acting Superintendent of the 
Yosemite National Park for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30.
1894, H. Exec. Doc 1, pt.5, vol.3, 53d Cong., 3d Sess., 1894:
675, quoted in Runte, National Parks. 202.
20Biswell, "The Big Trees and Fire," 12, 14.
21Vankat, "Fire and Man," 21.
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Fire Policy of the NPS from 1916-1968
On August 25, 1916 President Woodrow Wilson affixed his
signature to the National Park Service Act. The act rested 
upon the idea that the service's ". . . purpose is to
conserve the scenery and the natural and historic objects 
and the wild life therein and to provide for the enjoyment 
of the same in such a manner and by such means as will leave 
them unimpaired for future generations."22 This left the 
Park Service with a two fold mission, preservation and 
enjoyment. The act mentioned nothing regarding alteration 
of the environment, which was exactly what occurs when fire 
is kept out of the ecological activity of a wilderness area.
Initial fire control expertise in the Park Service came 
from "forestry and the Forest Service." Foresters brought 
with them their beliefs about fire.23 In 1905 the USDAFS 
published Use of the National Forests. According to the Use 
Book as it is commonly referred to, "fire was to be 
prevented as much as possible or extinguished as soon as it 
was discovered."24 The foresters saw fire as harmful to the 
forest because it ruined the value of the harvestable timber
22U.S., Statutes at Large. 39 (1916): 535.
23Pyne, Fire in America. 29 6.
24Agee, "Fire Management," 80. I will discuss the Use 
Book further in Chapter IV which deals exclusively with the 
Forest Service.
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crop. Once in the employ of the Park Service, they 
continued to perceive fire as an adverse condition affecting 
the economic well-being of the parks. Scorched areas were 
unsightly and took away from the aesthetic value of the 
park; burns were not something visitors paid money to see. 
This idea was propagated throughout the Park Service by the 
superintendents.
Funds were not appropriated by Congress until 1928 for 
general fire suppression in the parks. The amount allocated 
to the Park Service was $10,000. Previously, Congress had 
made separate appropriations for specific parks.25 The new 
funds were used for "personnel training, equipment, and 
operation; [which] led to the development of an effective 
fire suppression program by 1930."26
As more and more people began using the national parks 
for recreation, fire became the number one enemy of the Park 
Service. Burned acreage and fire were labeled as ghastly.
In 1929, Curtis K. Skinner wrote that "fire is today, 
without a doubt, the greatest threat against the perpetual 
scenic wealth of our largest National Parks, which, bereft 
of their trees and foliage, would become the haunts only of
25Henry Clepper, Professional Forestry in the U.S. 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971), 121.
26Vankat, "Fire and Man," 23.
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those interested in the study of desolation."27
In 1935 the USDA Forest Service adopted the "10 A.M."
policy. It stated that a fire was to be controlled by 10
A.M. the morning following the report. Suppression tactics
were to continue for a twenty-four hour cycle until the fire
was put out.28 This became unofficial policy in the
National Park Service until 1968 as evidenced below.
Part of the 1938 National Park Service Manual of the
Branch of Forestry objectives were:
To safeguard park visitors, forests, buildings, and 
property of every character against destruction or
injury from fire, [emphasis added]
To make the park fire protection organizations the best
trained and equipped and most efficient forest fire 
protection organizations in the Nation, because of the 
high scenic and recreational values at stake.
The manual was even more specific as to why forest fires are
a menace to life, property, and scenic values. As stated in
section B, (1) .
Fires within national parks and monuments constitute 
the greatest menace to the enjoyment of the areas since 
they not only threaten. . . the beauty of the parks and
monuments but may destroy valuable property, including 
historic objects of priceless value, and wildlife. . .
This is true whether the fire originates from human 
carelessness or from natural causes such as lightning. 
The national parks and monuments preserve remnants of 
the finest virgin forests known to man, which have been
27Curtis B. Skinner, "Fire, the Enemy of Our National 
Parks," American Forests and Forest Life 35, (August 1929): 
519.
28Evan W. Kelly, "Fire Control Truck Trails and Game 
Management," unpublished (1926), 1-2, USDAFS Region One, Fire 
files, box 6100. I will examine of the 10 A.M. Policy will in 
more detail in Chapter IV.
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set aside in order that future generations, as well as 
the present, may visualize and enjoy the magnificence 
of these virgin stands.
Therefore, although it is essential to maintain the 
national parks in their natural conditions so far as 
use and safety will permit, there can be no compromise 
with fire, and the Service has established the rule 
that every fire shall be reached and extinguished as 
quickly as possible, whether originating in a developed 
section or in a wilderness area. Fire suppression, 
therefore, takes precedence over all other park 
activities except the saving or safeguarding of human 
life.29 [emphasis added]
With allocated money, trained personnel, and state of the
art fire fighting equipment, the Park Service was determined
to keep fire out of its borders.
Experimentation with PNF and PB
The policy expressed above would not be directly 
challenged until the Leopold Report was published in 1963. 
However, in the early 1950s, "experimental" controlled 
burning was taking place in Everglades National Park. In 
1951 Dr. William Robertson, a research biologist, began to 
study the role fire performs in sustaining subclimax pine 
forests. "This was followed in 1958 by experimental 
research into prescribed burning as means of controlling 
tropical hardwood invasion of such pine forests."
Prescribed burning continued in "low-key" form until a more
29USDI, NPS, National Park Service Manual of the Branch of 
Forestry (n.p., 1938), iii, 5.
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"intensive" program was begun in 1972 .30
Between 1951 and 1966 two separate but parallel 
experimental studies concerning prescribed burning were 
being carried out in and around the vicinity of Sequoia and 
Kings Canyon National Parks. In 1951 Dr. Harold H. Biswell, 
professor of range management at University of California, 
Berkeley, began a study to illustrate that prescribed 
burning could be used as a fire-hazard reduction tool on the 
Teaford Forest in the central Sierra Nevada.31 Dr. R. J. 
Hartesveldt, Sna Jose State University, began a study in 
1964 to prove that the "regeneration of sequoias is greatly 
reduced or prevented in groves approaching the climax stage 
of plant succession in the absence of disturbance factors" 
(i.e. fire). Both of these studies were "encouraged" and 
financed by the National Park Service.32 Both scholars 
proved their hypotheses. Prescribed burning was found to be 
useful in removing long-time accumulations of fuel, and fire 
does, indeed, foster regeneration of sequoias approaching 
the climax stage.
With the findings of these studies and the publication 
of the Leopold Report, it was evident that prescribed
3uBruce M. Kilgore, "Fire Management," 47-48. Although it 
is not the focus of this paper, it should be noted that the 
Southeast was far ahead of the rest of the country in 
recognizing the serious consequences of removing the fire 
process from pine forests.
31Biswell, "Forest Fire in Perspective," 58-9.
32Hartesveldt and Harvey, "Sequoia Regeneration," 66.
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burning, or rather the contemporary policy of PNF, was not 
far from being implemented into the fire management programs 
of the aforementioned parks. Yellowstone possessed the 
needed physical size and climatic characteristics, and the 
parks in the Sierra Nevada contained the desired floral 
species (most notably the sequoia) and the geological 
formations (large outcrops of granite rock which would limit 
fire spread), which are ideal for PNF programs.
Incentives for the Application of PNF in the National Parks
The Leopold Report is without a doubt the main catalyst
behind the National Park Service adopting a PNF policy and
program as part of its managerial objectives. The report,
published in 1963, states that
As the primary goal [of the national parks], we 
recommend that the biotic association within each park 
be maintained, or where necessary recreated, as nearly 
as possible in the condition that prevailed when the 
area was first visited by the white man. A national 
park should represent a vignette of primitive 
America.33
In contrast to the "park-like" conditions the forty-
niners first saw in the Sierra Nevada, the report noted that
Today much of the west slope is a dog-hair thicket of 
young pines, white fir, incense cedar, and mature 
brush— a direct function of overprotection of natural 
ground fires. Within the four national parks— Lassen,
33Leopold, A.S., et al., "Study of Wildlife Problems in 
National Parks," 32.
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Yosemite, Sequoia, Kings Canyon— the thickets are even 
more impenetrable than anywhere else. Not only is this 
accumulation of fuel dangerous to the giant sequoias 
and other mature trees but animal life is meager, 
wildflowers are sparse, and to some at least the 
vegetative tangle is depressing, not uplifting. Is it 
possible that the primitive open forest could be 
restored, at least on a local scale? And if so, 
how?M
To accomplish this and to return the parks to a 
primitive state was to allow natural forces to "manipulate 
vegetation." According to the report, "the controlled use 
of fire is the most 'natural' and much the cheapest and 
easiest to apply."35 Of course the ever present problem of 
an abnormal amount of undergrowth on the forest floor would 
have to be removed. But "once this fuel is reduced, 
periodic burning can be conducted safely. . . "36
In order for national parks to represent a "vignette of 
primitive America," they would have to be managed as 
inclusive ecosystems. It is clear as many scholars have 
pointed out (specifically, Alston Chase, Playing God in 
Yellowstone) that it is impossible for any national park, 
and for that matter any national forest, to be managed in 
such a way. The Robbins Report, issued by the National 
Academy of Sciences, addresses this point. It states that 
"no national park is large enough or adequately isolated to 
be, in fact, a self-regulatory unit. . . " Further,
34Ibid. , 33.
35Ibid. , 37.
36Ibid.
40
"according to this point of view. . . controlled burning [is
a] necessary function of management if a park is to survive
in anything like the condition which meets the purpose for
which it was established."37
The Wilderness Act of 1964 was another document to
favor restoring fire to the national parks. To reemphasize
the growing popular concept of the time of "natural"
management of the parks, the act stated that federally
designated areas "shall be administered for the use and
enjoyment of the American people in such manner as will
leave them unimpaired for future use and enjoyment as
wilderness, and so as to provide for. . . the preservation
of their wilderness character."38 According to Section 4
(b) the act charged that
each agency administering any area designated as 
wilderness shall be responsible for preserving the 
wilderness character of the area and shall so 
administer such area for such other purposes for which 
it may have been established as also to preserve its 
wilderness character.39
Management practices concerning the preservation of
wilderness areas, according to the act, would be left up to
each managing agency respectively, be it the Park Service or
37William J. Robbins, A Report by the Advisory Committee 
to the National Park Service on Research of the National 
Academy of Sciences-National Research Council (Washington, 
D.C.: National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council, 
1963), 18-9.
38U.S., Statutes at Large. 78: 890-96.
39Ibid.
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the Forest Service. If wilderness should be an area that is 
"untrammeled by man," none of man's activities must be 
visible on the land including suppression tactics used to 
control fire. Hence, fire, a natural force, must be allowed 
to burn in wilderness if natural forces are the sole agents 
allowed free and unrestricted activity in such an area.
Publication of these reports, which the then Secretary 
of the Interior, Stewart Udall, requested, were too 
provocative to dismiss. The born-again environmental 
movement, in many ways spurred by Rachel Carson's book, 
Silent Soring (1962) and the Wilderness Act, wanted the 
parks to be returned to the proposed policy of "natural" 
management. Fire was part of this concept, and it would 
only be four years before fire was "officially" restored to 
the parks in the Sierra Nevada.
The Change of Fire Management Practices, 1968 to 1972
Fire management practices, in the 1960s and today, are 
not covered by explicit Congressional Acts. However, 
Congress does give direction in the formulation of 
administrative policies for natural, recreation, and 
historic areas. It "establishes. . . broad objectives for
park management, and administrative policies prescribe 
guidelines within those objectives for day-to-day
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management" of the above areas.40 In September of 1967 the
National Park Service reversed its policy of suppression in
favor PNF and PB. The new policy stated that
The presence or absence of fire within a given habitat 
is recognized as one of the ecological factors 
contributing to the perpetuation of plants and animals 
native to the habitat.
Fire in vegetation resulting from natural causes are 
recognized as natural phenomena and may be allowed to 
run their course when such burning can be contained 
within predetermined fire management units and when 
such burning will contribute to the accomplishment of 
approved vegetation and/or wildlife management 
obj ectives.
Prescribed burning to achieve approved vegetation 
and/or wildlife management objectives may be employed 
as a substitute for natural fire.41
Fire suppression, according to these guidelines, is still
recognized as an integral part of fire management if the
fire does not meet fire management objectives for PNF. The
1967 objectives would change little in twenty-six years.
Sequoia and Kings Canyon National Parks became the 
early leaders in allowing PNF "officially" to run its course 
on Park Service land. In 1968, after a short period of 
post-1967 experimentation, the Superintendent of the two 
parks, John McLaughlin, initiated a three phase fire program
40Agee, "Fire Management," 81-82.
41USDI, NPS, Compilation of the Administrative Policies of 
the National Parks and National Monuments of Scientific 
Significance (Natural Area Category) (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, rev. 1970), 16-17.
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that allowed: "(1) natural fires to burn in higher elevation
zones; (2) prescribed burning in middle elevation sequoia
mixed conifer forests; and (3) continued suppression in
lower elevation and developed areas."42 This policy was
mirrored in Yosemite. As more natural fires were permitted
to burn, research scientists were able to gather more
information concerning fire regime history, and subsequently
the "Fire Management Zone," in which PNF and PB could burn,
was enlarged to include more and more acreage.
Yosemite fire managers understood clearly the
importance of allowing fire to burn in the park. The Fire
Management Policy, written in 1977, stated:
The presence or absence of natural fire within a given 
habitat is recognized as one of the ecological factors 
contributing to the perpetuation of plants and animals 
to that native habitat.
Prescribed burning to achieve approved vegetation 
and/or wildlife management objectives may be employed 
as a substitute for natural fire.43
By 1981, after thirteen years, Yosemite, Sequoia, and 
Kings Canyon let 447 lightning ignited fires, and 149 
manager ignited fires burn 79,283 acres. This number of 
fires, and the expanse burned, is second only to Everglades 
National Park.44
42Kilgore, "Fire Management," 48-50.
43"Forest Fire Control," 1977, 1, File Y14, USDI, Yosemite 
National Park Archives, California.
^Bruce M. Kilgore, "Fire Management Programs in National 
Parks and Wilderness," in Proceedings of the Joint Fire 
Council: Fire - Its Field Effects in Jackson. WY. October 19-
Yellowstone was a prime candidate for a PNF program due 
to its climate and size.45 In 1972 the park began to 
operate with PNF as part of its fire management plan. (This 
was the year that the Second World Conference on National 
Parks was held at Yellowstone, and the same year that the 
park celebrated its one hundredth birthday.) But 
Yellowstone's fire management plan permitted only lightning- 
caused ignitions to burn within park boundaries. There were 
no manager-ignited fires. The park designated an area of 
some 340,784 acres as a "natural fire zone."46 The new 
policy was based on the following criteria: "(1) The area 
should be managed as wilderness; (2) Natural fires occurring 
in the areas must not pose an immediate threat to primary 
visitor use areas such as Old Faithful; (3) Human life must 
not be endangered under any circumstances; (4) Lands under
the management of other agencies must be protected."47 
Hence, all man- or lightning-caused fires threatening any
21, 1982, ed. James E. Lotan (Missoula: The Intermountain Fire 
Council and Pierre: The Rocky Mountain Fire Council, 1982), 
65.
45Yellowstone' s geological composition and environmental 
characteristics are examined in detail in Chapter IV.
46USDI, NPS, The Natural Role of Fire: A Fire Management
Plan (Yellowstone National Park, Wyoming, 1976), 8.
47Sellers and Despain, "Fire Management in YNP," 102.
National Park Service's PNF policies do not differentiate 
between wilderness and nonwilderness lands as is done in the 
Forest Service. All natural park lands are managed to 
"perpetuate natural ecosystems," with the exception of 
developed areas. The fourth component of this management 
criteria would not be carried out in 1988.
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development would be suppressed. Only seventeen fires, 
which consumed a total of 2 acres, burned during the fire 
season (summer-early fall) of 1972.48
In 1976 fire managers in Yellowstone rewrote the fire 
plan. Included in the plan, the managers cited ecological 
reasons for allowing fire to burn freely in the park.- The 
plan stated that exclusion of fire in the park had 
"undesirable effects" such as:
(1) Unnatural plant succession, with reduced wildlife
habitats; (2) Unnatural accumulations of fuels and
reduced seed germination; (3) Unnatural dense
understory of fire susceptible species.49
Park scientists hoped to reverse this environmental wrong 
and thus, the area in which lightning ignited fires were 
permitted to burn was increased to 1,700,000 acres. This 
included all portions of the park being managed as 
wilderness.50
Between 1972 and 1981, 114 fires ran their natural 
course in Yellowstone burning a total of only 33,000 
acres.51 This is considerably less acreage burned than that
48USDI, NPS, Annual Report of the Superintendent of 
Yellowstone National Park (n.p., 5 January 1972), 8.
49USDI, NPS, Final Environmental Assessment: Natural Fire
Management Plan for Yellowstone National Park (n.p., 1976), 2.
50Despain and Sellers, "Natural Fire," 20.
51Bruce M. Kilgore, "Fire Management Programs in National 
Parks and Wilderness," 72. As will be evidenced Chapter IV, 
Yellowstone's climate and geological composition does not 
provide the necessary natural elements for an active PNF or PB 
program.
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in the Sierra Nevada parks, which authorized not only 
natural fires, but manager ignited fires as well.52 Since 
"Yellowstone has the largest natural fire zone [this is 
still true today] of any park or forest unit in the nation, 
the natural, park staff ,[felt] fairly confident that most 
fires would not impact other agency lands."55 As we shall 
see, the fires of 1988 that started inside the park would, 
before ceasing, extend far outside the park's boundaries 
onto Forest Service land.
NPS—18
As park management objectives changed to blend with 
national policy (that employed by the FS, BLM, BIA, and 
FWS), the National Park Service expanded on its policy 
concerning fire. The result was a service-wide manual 
called Fire Management Guidelines, better known as NPS-18. 
NPS—18 was first released in 1968 and has been updated every 
few years. (There is no specific interval for the renewal 
of these guidelines.) It contained the first complete 
instructions for park fire programs. NPS-18 "instructed
52More than 90 percent of the natural fires in Yellowstone
and the Sierra Nevada regions burn out in less than a quarter
of an acre. Bruce M. Kilgore, "Restoring Fire to National
Park Wilderness," American Forester 81 (March 1975): 16-17.
53Ibid.
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superintendents to build a program commensurate to the needs 
of the park and provided a detailed policy that was to give 
all levels of management a consistent point of reference for 
fire management.1'54 There was little communication between 
Park Service personnel as to how each individual park was 
administering its fire management program. Since NPS-18 
left fire management policy and program formulation up to 
individual park personnel, the Sierra Nevada parks and 
Yellowstone saw little reason to alter their programs since 
they believed their policies and programs to be 
"commensurate to the needs of the park."
Agency-wide concerns were more directed toward using 
fire as an ecological tool. The service recognized that 
fire, as a "natural phenomena[,] . . . must be permitted to
continue to influence the ecosystem if truly natural systems 
are to be perpetuated."55 It gave little concern to 
individual fire management policies and programs.
The last NPS-18 guidelines to be published prior to the 
Yellowstone fires of '88 were drafted in 1986. The manual 
specifically stated that PNF, "fires ignited by natural 
means (commonly lightning), may be allowed to burn naturally
54David A. Butts, "Fire Policies and Programs of the 
National Park System," in Symposium and Workshop on Wilderness 
Fire. 44. The 1978b version of NPS-18 was cited in the 
article.
55USDI, NPS, National Park Service Management Policies. 
1983, in Fire Management Plan (Yosemite National Park, March 
1990), 3.
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if properly planned and monitored. The plan [must] include 
an approved fire management plan that designates fire 
management units [number of acres] and the stated conditions 
when and where the fire may be allowed to burn unimpeded by 
suppression efforts.”56
Yellowstone fire management personnel did not follow 
this directive. The 1986 fire management plan was not 
approved by appropriate Yellowstone and National Park 
Service personnel, nor did it include burn prescriptions 
(predetermined weather and fuel conditions during which 
managers allow fire to burn) for the designated fire 
management units.57 In ecological terms, would approval of 
"paper prescriptions” have affected the size and intensity 
of the fires of 1988? This is just one of the areas of 
controversy surrounding the historic Yellowstone blaze.
Before one can fully comprehend the cause of the 
Yellowstone fire and the subsequent implications stemming
-56USDI, NPS, Wildland Fire Management Guidelines. NPS-18, 
(n.p., 1986), 5.
57Information derived from an interview with Ronald H. 
Wakimoto, 5 and 8 May 1993. Wakimoto is a professor of 
forestry at the University of Montana and Stephen J. Pyne, 
Wildland Fire Management Plan for Yellowstone National Park, 
unpublished, 2 August 1985. Copy in possession of the author. 
It should be noted that Pyne's plan proposed a means by which 
to formalize the decision process for allowing PNF, but it did 
not contain fire prescriptions--Yellowstone would not allow 
any to be written in. Pyne's plan was not adopted by 
Yellowstone. I should also note that I have been unable to 
examine a copy of the 1986 fire plan, as none are available. 
I enquired about examining a copy during a visit, but found 
that their are no copies in Yellowstone's library or the fire 
cache.
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from post-fire investigations regarding federal agency fire 
management guidelines, it is imperative to have an 
understanding of the history of the Forest Service. Forest 
Service policies and programs did not always parallel the 
Park Service's, and during the 1988 fire season the 
discrepancies came to the forefront.
CHAPTER III
FIRE POLICY AND PROGRAM IN THE FOREST SERVICE
During the eighty-seven year history of the Forest 
Service, fire has evolved, as it did in the Park Service, 
from an environmental tragedy to an integral part in the 
creation and maintenance of a healthy forest ecosystem. In 
the late 1960s fire was no longer depicted as the villain of 
the forest. At this time, resource managers began adopt the 
concept of fire management which dictated that fire be 
allowed to play its natural role in wilderness. Use of PNF 
allowed fire once again to roam freely across certain tracts 
of our national forests.
In 1972, Region One of the Forest Service, the northern 
Rocky Mountains, designated the White Cap Fire Management 
Area in the Selway-Bitterroot Wilderness as the first area 
in which a PNF would be permitted to burn on Forest Service 
land.1 Natural fire, even if it must stay within 
prescription guidelines,2 had once again returned to our
’Kilgore, "Fire Management Programs in National Parks and 
Wilderness," 73. Between 1972-1978, approval for PNF on 
Forest Service land had to come from the Chief of the Forest 
Service.
2Simply stated, "written prescriptions— spell out 
conditions under which fire may be allowed to burn." 
Conditions are such things as the maximum allowable perimeters 
and blaze intensities for each individual fire. Tom 
Kovalicky, "Wilderness Fire Management Plan,' in Symposium and 
Workshop on Wilderness Fire. 137.
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national forests.
The history of Forest Ser.vice fire policy is a detailed 
account that demonstrates, humanity's ever changing attitude 
toward the land and the peculiar American need to preserve 
the natural -- wilderness. Today, using historical 
hindsight, an environmentalist would realize that the fire
i • psuppression tactics exercised by early rangers interfered 
with', nature' s course; however, the giant leaps that have 
been made since the 1960s prove that Americans, through 
ecologically enlightened management principles, are 
attempting to correct their past mistakes by allowing fire 
in wilderness to manage itself, 
o
The Founding Years:1876-1910
Formation of the Forest Service took place over three 
decades. On August 15, 187 6 a rider to an appropriations
act which called for a man of "approved attainments" to 
study ". . . the annual amount of consumption, importation,
and exportation of timber and other forests products, the 
probable supply of future wants, the best means adapted to 
their preservation and renewal, . . . [and measures] . . .
for the preservation and restoration or planting of forests 
. . ." was signed into law.3 Dr. Franklin Hough, "a
3U .S ., Statutes at Large. 19 (1876): 167.
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physician and naturalist,” received $2,000 to conduct the 
examination. The appointment was termed by one historian as
"a modest beginning, for both the Forest Service and
professional forestry” in the United States.4
In 1880, the Secretary of Agriculture created the 
Division of Forestry which Congress authorized in an 
appropriations act approved June 30, 1886.5 Bernard Fernow 
assumed control of the division in the same year. Under his 
auspices the "foundations of professional forestry” were 
laid, including the application of scientific research.6 In 
1898 Gifford Pinchot succeeded Fernow as head of the
Division of Forestry which became the Bureau of Forestry in
1901. Four years later the administration of the forest 
reserves, which were created by the Forest Reserve Act of 
1891,7 was transferred from the Department of the Interior 
to the Department of Agriculture.8 The same year, 1905, 
Pinchot changed the name once more to the Forest Service.9
4Glen 0. Robinson, The Forest Service: A Study in Public 
Land Management (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1975) , 2 .
5U.S., Statutes at Large, 24 (1886): 103.
6Robinson, The Forest Service. 5.
7U.S., Statutes at Large. 26 (1891): 1095.
8U.S., Statutes at Large. 33 (1905): 628. This statute
is commonly referred to as the Transfer Act.
9A detailed history of the Forest Service's early years 
is provided by Robinson in The Forest Service. 1-16.
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Pinchot wanted to professionalize the service with a 
corps of expert foresters. As a conservationist, he 
believed in using the nation's natural resources in a 
responsible manner for human development. To Pinchot 
"silviculture and economics were the fundamentals of 
forestry, and [he], demanding that the national forests be 
conducted as a public utility, told the nation that the 
forests would, like any other business, become a paying 
proposition. 1,10 He advocated the more modern concept of 
"sustained yield," which "simply means a yield of forest 
products that can be sustained in perpetuity."11 Pinchot 
visualized the forests as a farmer views a field of corn—  
each are crops.12 Like any farmer with an economic mind, 
Pinchot wanted to protect the forests from any and all 
dangers. Fire in the forest was Pinchot's nightmare. In 
his efforts to standardize the rules and regulations of the 
Forest Service, Pinchot wrote the first official manual for 
forest rangers in 1905 entitled, The Use of the National 
Forest Reserves: Regulations and Instructions. In the book
10Pyne, Fire in America. 2 64. 
nRobinson, The Forest Service. 64.
^Preservationists, those who advocate the perpetuation of 
"virgin" areas, did not let Pinchot's viewpoints go 
unchallenged. The most popular of the so called
preservationist v. conservationist debates, between John Muir 
and Pinchot regarding Hetch Hetchy, is examined superbly in 
Roderich Nash, Wilderness in the American Mind. 3rd ed. (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), 161-181.
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he stated that, "officers of the Forest Service, especially
forest rangers, have no more important duty than protecting
the reserves from forest fires."13 With the publication of 
the Use Book, the duties of the Forest Service and the 
ranger were clear: fire control had top priority.
A Year that Sparked Action: 1910 and Its Implications
Undoubtedly, the fires of 1910, which burned an 
estimated 1 million acres in Washington and Oregon and an
estimated 3 million acres of Montana and Idaho,14 were the
most widely known fire events in the Northwest prior to the 
1988 fire in the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem. The fires in 
Montana and Idaho burned mainly within the boundaries that 
constitute present day Region One of the Forest Service.15 
Slightly over half of the fires of 1910 can be attributed to 
locomotives or hoboes who travelled the rails since "56 
percent of the total fires occurred within [railroad] right-
13USDAFS, The Use of the National Forest Preserves: 
Regulations and Instructions (n.p., 1905), 65. This
publication is commonly referred to as the Use Book.
14Pyne, Fire in America. 243. Pyne also notes that large 
fires in California, South Dakota (Black Hills), Nebraska 
(Sand Hills), and Minnesota (Baudette fire) also burned in the 
1910 fire season.
15A map of Region One is located at the end of the text.
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of-ways."16 A few of the fires resulted from land clearing 
and campfires. However, most of the damage from the fires 
"resulted from a scant 15 percent of the fires -- all of 
them started in remote locations and virtually all ignited 
by lightning.1,17 In all, "eighty-five lives were lost 
besides the destruction of several towns, mines, ranches and 
livestock, and millions of acres of forest land left a 
blackened waste."18 As Elers Koch, a forester from 1903- 
1942, stated, the fire "was a complete defeat for the newly 
organized Forest Service forces. . . ",9 No matter how
these fires started they prompted sixty-five years of 
intense fire suppression by the Forest Service.
Due to the destruction of private land holdings and the 
large loss of life during and after the 1910 fire events, 
"the focus shifted from the fire to the men who sought to 
contain it; the behavior of the fire fighters and of fire 
organization was of more interest than that of the fire."20 
Further, the fires "did increase public support [for fire 
control] which in turn provided financing for the 
strengthened capability needed during several severe fire
I6Pyne, Fire in America. 24 3.
17Ibid.
18Elers Koch, "Forty Years a Forester," n.d., 68, USDAFS 
Region One, Fire files, box 6100.
19Ibid.
20Pyne, Fire in America. 24 6.
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years of the teens, twenties and early nineteen thirties."21 
These fires occurred in 1914, 1917, 1919, 1925, 1926, 1931,
and 1934 .22 With this new interest in fire suppression, and 
the allocation of funds from Congress, fire fighting 
technology advanced considerably in the next two-and-a-half 
decades. "Since 1910," and because of the allocation of 
this money, "much of the history of the Forest Service can 
be translated into a succession of efforts to get fire 
fighters on fires as soon as possible— the sooner, the 
smaller the fire."23
Much of the backcountry, in what is today legislated 
wilderness, had yet to be opened up by trails and roads in 
the early third of the twentieth century. As Stephen Pyne 
noted:
The imperatives of fire control opened up the remote 
backcountry. Fire control built roads and trails, 
strung telephone lines, constructed observation towers, 
influenced the direction of forest research and 
equipment development, and made the region a national 
authority on the fire question.24
By 1916-1918 most of the lookouts built after the 1910 fire
21William R. (Bud) Moore, "Results from Historic and 
Contemporary Application of Fire Policies in Classified 
Wilderness Areas," unpublished paper delivered at the
Wilderness/Parks Fire Conference, Bozeman, 23 May 1989, 2.
Copy in possession of author.
22"Fire breeds fire." For several decades after the 1910 
fire, the dead and downed timber served as a tinder box for
the spread of fire. Koch, "Forty Years a Forester", 69.
23Norman Maclean, Young Men and Fire (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1992), 23.
24Pyne, Fire in America. 2 50.
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were equipped with telephones. A single wire strung 
intermittently between trees some fifty feet apart connected 
each lookout with each district's ranger station.25 Modern 
technology had begun its nonstop deployment into the process 
of forest fire control and later forest fire management.
Up to 1911, the largest sum of federal money for fire 
control came from the Weeks Act. The act broadened the 
forestry activities on both the federal and jthe state level. 
Overall, "The basic purpose of the act [was] to buy and 
restore timberlands severely damaged by excessive cutting, 
fire, disease, or farming."26 More specifically, Section 
two of the act authorized "$200,000 to be used as federal 
matching funds for states having a forest protection agency 
which met government standards."27 Any state applying for 
money had a cap of $10,000 on the amount it could request. 
The federal money was to be spent for patrolmen's salaries 
while the state had to allocate the same amount to fire 
protection. Some of the money spent went indirectly into 
construction and maintenance of telephone lines and trails. 
Thus, "federally assisted state agencies. . . assumed a
25John V. Puckett, interview with author, 28 October 1993. 
Puckett was employed by the Forest Service in Region One for 
thirty-four years.
26Robinson, The Forest Service. 11.
27Harold K. Steen, The U.S. Forest Service: A History
(Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1976), 129.
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major role in fire protection"28 and at the same time the 
act "marked the beginning of federal-state cooperative fire 
control."29 However, the Forest Service maintained its 
position as the national leader in the field of fire 
suppression.
In the spring of 1928, with the backing of the American 
Forestry Association, Ohio Congressman John R. McSweeney and 
Oregon Senator Charles L. McNary were able to push their 
legislation through Congress. The McSweeney-McNary Act 
"formalized and strengthened" forestry research.30 The act 
established a major branch of the Forest Service, 
Experimental Forestry. More specifically, the act included 
allocations for fire research. No longer was the Forest 
Service charged only with control and suppression of fire. 
The service had a new mandate, one that called for the study 
of fire's affects on the forest as well as the development 
of new equipment to battle the blazes.
In 1930, a "turning point" in fire control policy had 
arrived with the implementation of the strategy set forth by 
E. I. Kotok and Stuart B. Show known as the hour control 
policy. According to this policy the "'objectives in fire 
control' should be based on considerations of the variations
28Ibid. , 130.
29Ibid. , 281.
30Ibid. , 194
in fire damage among various forest types."31 In other 
words, certain types of forest species, such as pine and 
spruce, were indexed on a scale in relation to their value 
as marketable timber. The types of trees which brought a 
higher dollar per board feet would receive greater priority 
in fire control and suppression than less valuable timber. 
The concept behind this policy was to be able to be on the 
scene of a fire as soon as possible; presumably, the sooner 
one arrived to fight the fire the smaller it would be, and 
the more marketable trees would be saved. Thus, the fire 
fighters would be able to have the fire under control within 
an hour.32 Of course, to be able to locate a fire and 
control it within an hour, a system of trails and lookouts 
had to be established in remote backcountry areas. Prior to 
1930, funds had been allocated for construction and 
maintenance of trails and lookouts, but if fires were to be 
controlled within an hour, a large and cheap labor force 
needed to be available to increase and improve those 
structures already in place.
The conservation programs of the New Deal gave the 
Forest Service the manpower it desired. Army-run CCC camps 
provided more man power than could often be used. Achieving 
the goals set by the hour control policy posed no trouble in 
the Depression Era.
31Pyne, Fire in America, 273 .
32Ibid.
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The New Deal swept away economic objections to an 
expansive program in fire control. [In fact], the 
emergency suppression account was enlarged to encompass 
presupression activities. . .Roads, trails, telephone 
lines, lookouts, fuelbreaks, hazard reductions, and 
guard stations— all appeared overnight.33
For the first time fire crews stood ready for action before
fires had started. CCC crews replaced volunteer fire crews
and fire guards. However beneficial these programs seemed
to have been, the absence of manpower once the New Deal
ended, due to America's entrance into WWII, left the Forest
Service without the means to meet its goals.34 But, before
the CCC camps disbanded, the Forest Service instituted a new
policy, one that would last for forty-three years.
Major Evan W. Kelley and the 10 A.M. Policy: 1935-1972
The amount of timber lost to wildfire remained too high 
for foresters even with new suppression tactics and 
technologies. Between 1910-1929 close to a million acres a 
year burned in Region One of the Forest Service. These were 
unacceptable losses in the minds of foresters at the time.35
In May, 1929, because of his^fEvan Kelley's] extensive 
experience in the West and his familiarity with the
33Ibid. , 275.
34Ibid. , 275-277.
35Puckett, interview, 28 October 1993.
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problems of fire control, he was named Regional 
Forester at Missoula, Montana, headquarters of the 
Northern Region--one of the most difficult "fire 
regions" of the country.36
As William R. (Bud) Moore stated simply, Major Kelley was
"iron fisted" and came to stop the fires in Region One.37
Kelley designed the 10 A.M. Policy to do just that.
Although Kelley advocated this policy as early as 1926,
the Forest Service did not adopt it until 1935 after the
1934 fire season when fires burned an estimated 250,000
acres in the Lochsa and Selway drainages (part of the
Northern Region's forest) .38 The Major expected all of the
foresters under his command to follow this policy strictly.
Moore, who joined the Forest Service in 1935, wrote that
"when it came to fighting fires, Kelley tolerated no
mediocre performance. He weeded the less than fully
committed from the organization by required investigation of
every fire that escaped control."39 Total fire suppression
would become the Forest Service's trademark until the 1970s.
36"Major Evan W. Kelley," n.d., 2, USDAFS Region One, Fire 
files, box 6100.
37William R. (Bud) Moore, interview with author, 16 
October 1993. Moore served under Kelley during his 39 years 
as a forester.
38Kelley, "Fire Control Truck Trails and Game Management,"
1-2; Moore, "Results from Historic and Contemporary 
Application of Fire Policies," 2. The 1934 fire was the 
largest fire in this region until the Yellowstone fires of 
1988. The 10 A.M. Policy is explained in Chapter III.
39 Ibid.
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Kelley's policy, like the hour control ideology, 
demanded fire fighting resources (manpower, lookouts, and 
trails) to function. World War Two and the end of the New 
Deal reduced the means on which the service depended to meet 
its fire control aims; but nevertheless, the 10 A.M. Policy 
lived on. The policy incorporated rural fire protection and 
"acquired new incentives from civil defense. . . Both gave
fire control a further sense of urgency, even a new moral 
energy."40 The Cold War also helped fund fire suppression. 
Both the Office of Civil Defense and the Department of 
Defense gave money for fire research and surplus military 
equipment to combat blazes. The Forest Service became a 
type of "paramilitary" unit of the national defense system. 
Wildfire appeared to be an enemy of the nation and the 
Forest Service had the right men for combat.41 Thus, until 
1972, Kelley and his successors tolerated nothing less than 
total commitment to fire control.
Some foresters did question this policy. Harry T. 
Gisborne, a forest researcher from 1917 to 1949, advocated 
prescribed fire as early as 1949 .42 He believed that if the 
10 A.M Policy became a permanent part of Forest Service fire 
fighting philosophy, the policy itself "should be etched in
40Pyne, Fire in America. 2 87.
41Ibid.
42Harry T. Gisborne, "Forestry Protection," in Robert K. 
Winters, ed., Fifty Years of Forestry in the U.S.A. 
(Washington, Society of American Foresters, 1950), 37.
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black granite” because it was detrimental to the forests.43
As a proponent of prescribed burning, Gisborne knew that
keeping fire from playing its natural role in the forest
ecosystem would have damaging effects on the forest in the
long run. As this paper will demonstrate, Gisborne's
arguments were portentous.
Before commencing a discussion of the new era in fire
management begins, it is necessary to understand the
condition the national forests were in nearly forty years
after the start of the aggressive fire control programs is
necessary. Bud Moore, a Region One forester from 1935 to
1974, paints a picture of the forests prior to the 1970s as
well as anyone could. By 1969, just thirty-five years after
the start of the 10 A.M. Policy,
We [foresters] had reduced burned acreage dramatically 
on the national forests. By controlling fire, we had
in many areas, especially in wilderness and other
natural areas, created fuel buildups of large 
proportions and we had, through fire protection, begun 
the conversion of forests to unnatural conditions. We 
had developed within the Forest Service a warlike 
competency and culture against fire. And we had long 
passed the point on the cost-benefit scale where it no 
longer paid, economically or biologically, to further 
reduce burned acreage on the national forests.44
Many of the foresters in the late 1960s and early 1970s in
the Northern Region, and for that matter in the entire U.S.,
must have been considering developing PNF programs since
43Puckett, interview, 28 October 1993.
^Moore, "Results from Historic and Contemporary 
Application of Fire Policies," 2.
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Sequoia/Kings Canyon and Yosemite National Parks 
incorporated them into their fire management programs in 
1968. And to further spur on the Forest Service in this 
direction, Yellowstone National Park's PNF went into effect 
in 1972. The scientific community realized that the human 
refusal to let fire play its natural role in the forest was 
having adverse effects on the ecological balance of our 
nation's wilderness areas.45
Fortunately in 1969, Moore served as Assistant Regional 
Forester for Fire Control and Air Operations. He intended 
"to develop and implement the concept of managing fires to 
help achieve the multiple objectives sought for each of the 
many unique land units of the National Forests."46 Moore 
saw that "a new fire policy tied closer to the management of 
the land, was needed."47 Under Moore's guidance, the first 
experimental PNF in the Forest Service took place in 1972 in 
the White Cap drainage of the Bitterroot National Forest in 
Region One.48 Incentive for this type of experimental fire 
in the Forest Service, like the Park Service, can be traced
45Hartesveldt and Harvey, "The Fire Ecology of Sequoia 
Regeneration," 65-77 and Sellers and Despain, "Fire 
Management in Yellowstone National Park," 99-113. Both of 
these articles provide information on the ecological impetus 
for allowing fire to burn in the National Parks of the Sierra 
Nevada and Yellowstone, respectively,
46Moore, "Results from Historic and Contemporary 
Application of Fire Policies," 3.
47Ibid. , 2.
48Ibid.
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back to the Wilderness Act.
The Concept of Wilderness and Fire
As the culminating achievement of the growing 
wilderness cult in the United States, the Wilderness Act 
served as the catalyst which the Forest Service needed to 
begin a PNF program. The service found itself in charge of 
numerous 1 legislative" wilderness areas after this act 
passed.
The authority for fire in wilderness areas had been 
indirectly given in the act. The idea of wilderness and 
wilderness areas play a pivotal role in the PNF program of 
the Forest Service.
Many writers have dealt with the concept of wilderness, 
but few have examined the relationship between fire and 
wilderness. The fire management aspect of the Forest 
Service relies heavily upon the wilderness concept in its 
practical rationalization of permitting fire free passage on 
the service's land.
Fire management and land management go hand-in-hand in 
the Forest Service. As Moore stated, the idea is "to manage 
the fire program in a way that [will] complement the things 
we [are] trying to achieve on forest land."49 By allowing
49Moore, interview, 16 October 1993.
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fire free reign in wilderness, the service is trying to
achieve a stable ecosystem with indigenous floral and faunal
species that will be less susceptible to diseases and
noxious species. As one of the key initiators of the PNF
program in the Forest Service, Moore believes that fire
should not be limited to wilderness, but should be applied
to any place the above objective is sought: for Moore this
constitutes all forest land. Unfortunately, wilderness is
the only area where these objectives apply.50
One of the objectives of the White Cap study in 1972
was to allow fire to return to its historic role in
affecting the ecological composition of the area. As Robert
W. Mutch, a research forester involved with the White Cap
study, wrote:
Many plants and animals are adapted to the cyclic 
occurrence of wildland fires. Different patterns of 
fire intensities, controlled by differences in fuels, 
weather, and topography, produce a mosaic of habitats 
that ensure community diversity.51
The diversity of flora and fauna species continues to be an
integral part of Forest Service fire management programs.
These simple objectives of the late 1960s and early 1970s
buttressed the complex goals of the PNF program from 1978 to
the present in the Forest Service.
A shift in Forest Service thinking, from the idea of
50Ibid.
51Robert W. Mutch, "I Thought Forest Fires were Black," 
Western Wildlands 1 (Summer 1974): 17.
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fire as evil to fire as an ecological good, is evident in 
the titles of the agency's primary in-house publications 
concerning fire. The first text, Fire Control Notes, was 
published in 1935 after the adoption of the 10 A.M. Policy. 
After the 1972 fire season and the White Cap study, the 
title of the work was changed to Fire Management Notes.
National Fire Danger Rating System and PNF
The development of the National Fire Danger Rating
System (NFDRS) played a major role in the Forest Service's
decision to begin a PNF program. From its inception in 1934
to the present, the system has continually developed.
In 1934, Harry Gisborne developed the Fire-Danger Meter
(FDM), an early version of the present day NFDRS. Gisborne
calculated "fire-danger factors" by integrating
fuel moisture percentage, wind velocity, relative 
humidity, normal or.abnormal number of people or 
lightning storms, and period of land clearing or peak 
brush burning activity. Taken together, the factors 
produced six classes of fire danger in terms of both 
rate of fire spread and administrative action needed to 
cope with probable danger.32
With this advancement the age of fire related research in
the Forest Service jumped off to a running start in 1934.
Gisborne revised the FDM several times during his life
52USDAFS, The Gisborne Era of Forest Fire Research: Legacy 
of Pioneer FS-367, (n.p., April 1983), 21.
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time, but the next significant advance in fire-forecasting 
technology came in 1961. A new system, now called NFDRS, 
was ready for testing. It constituted "a four-phase rating 
system based on ignition, risk, fuel energy and spread. .
. 1,53 The system underwent upgrading in- 1964, 1968, 1972,
1978 ,54 and 1988. The revised editions of the NFDRS also 
incorporated data from past fires, such as acres burned, 
weather conditions and, drought severity. Studying this 
historical record allowed foresters to predict the course, 
size and intensity of current and future fires.
It is not a coincidence that the Forest Service 
inaugurated an agency-wide policy of allowing PNF in its 
forests in 1978. The Forest Service felt confident that it 
would not be relying on "blind faith" in allowing PNFs to 
burn. Instead it had some scientific knowledge upon which 
to base its PNF decisions.55 With this scientific 
information foresters could (and still do) predict, with 
some accuracy, the rate of spread and the path of the fire. 
This is important because, as will be explained later, PNF 
are only allowed to burn within a certain "maximum allowable 
perimeter" within the wilderness area. Hence, if it appears 
that a fire will burn out of prescription, appropriate 
suppression action can be taken.
53Pyne, Fire in America. 48 6.
54Ibid.
55Wakimoto, interview, 8 March 1993.
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The NFDRS is not one hundred percent accurate. As 
Robert W. Mutch, now a research forester at the 
Intermountain Fire Sciences Laboratory in Missoula, MT, 
stated, the NFDRS is "no replacement for [the] judgement and 
intuition" of a fire manager.56 Science may never replace 
intuition; nonetheless, further refinement on fire 
predictability concerning rate and path of spread is 
presently taking place.57
A Change in Policy: Fire Management and 1978
Four years after the first experiment with PNF in 
Region One, lightning caused fires, burning within 
prescribed conditions, were allowed to run their course in 
parts of the Selway-Bitterroot Wilderness, Bitterroot and 
Nez Perce National Forests in Idaho; the Gila Wilderness in 
New Mexico; the Teton Wilderness, Bridger-Teton National 
Forest in Wyoming; and in two nonwilderness forests in South 
Carolina.58 In 1978 the Chief Forester delegated 
responsibility to Regional Foresters to decide if a natural
56Robert W, Mutch, interview with author, 5 November 93.
57Robert E. Burgan, a research forester, revised the NFDRS 
in 1988 and is continuing his work at present. Mark Finney, 
also a research forester, is developing a fire growth model 
based on Hygans principal of seventeenth century light wave 
calculations.
58Kilgore, "Fire Management," 64.
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ignition in wilderness was to be labelled a wildfire59 or 
PNF. Official policy which had been "fire control" now was 
"fire management." The revised policy called for "well- 
planned and executed fire protection and fire use programs 
that are cost- effective and responsive to land and resource 
management goals and objectives. . ."60 As noted above,
resource management objectives in wilderness call for the 
preservation of "untrammeled" land which is to be managed in 
a way which will not alter the natural ecology of the area. 
Thus, the new policy officially permitted natural fire to 
return to the land.
Although major policy guidelines changed following the 
1988 fire season, the implementation and goals of PNF 
programs would remain mainly intact. Each separate forest 
had to have its own fire plan approved by the Regional 
Forester before it could place its fire management program 
on-line. If a line officer on a specific forest wanted to 
allow PNF in his wilderness he had to have a wilderness fire 
management plan approved by the Regional Forester. Each 
fire management plan for wilderness, according to William C. 
Fischer, a research forester at the Northern Forest Fire 
Laboratory, could be separated into six essential elements:
59Wildfires are "unwanted fires started either by natural 
forces or people (arson or carelessness). USDAFS, Symposium 
and Workshop on Wilderness Fire, foreword.
60USDAFS, Forest Service Manual. Title 5100 - Fire
Management, Amend. 56 (Washington, D.C.: USDAFS, 1978), 3 of 
1 0.
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(1) describing fire and ecosystem interactions; (2) 
describing special resource and use considerations; (3) 
defining fire management objectives; (4) delineating 
fire management units and zones; (5) developing fire 
management prescriptions; (6) devising a fire 
management plan.61
It is not by happenstance that the first objective in
developing a fire management plan for wilderness is
"describing fire and ecosystem interactions." According to
the Wilderness Act, before implementation of any management
plans in wilderness areas, it must be determined that the
action to be taken, or in this case, allowed, will not alter
the natural condition of the land. Thus, in fire
management, the character of the wilderness commands the
highest priority.
The wilderness fire management plan is based on the
belief that fire should play its natural role in the
ecosystem. By doing so fire will:
(1)perpetuate the naturally occurring plants and 
animals; (2)perpetuate natural vegetative patterns 
[and]; (3)maintain [the] 'natural' fire regime.62
The use of fire to accomplish these resource management
objectives will also further contribute to the wilderness
character of the area because it will:
(1)restore fire where suppression has had adverse 
effects; (2)create, maintain, or enhance habitat for 
threatened, endangered, or desired plants and animals;
6IWilliam C. Fischer, "Elements of Wilderness Fire
Management Planning," in Symposium and Workshop on Wilderness
Fire, 138.
62Ibid. , 140.
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(3)prevent or abate undesirable fuel situations.63 
Hence, resource managers who drew up the new policy of fire 
management in 1978 had the welfare and maintenance of a 
balanced and healthy ecosystem in mind.
Prior to the 1988, Region One had eighteen approved 
fire management plans.64 Between 1978 and 1988, 341 
separate fires burned 67,816 acres of designated 
wilderness.65 After the historic fires of 1988, all of the 
Department of Agriculture and Department of Interior 
agencies canceled their PNF and PB programs and suppressed 
all fires in 1989. Policies and programs were reviewed and 
PNF programs began to be brought back on-line in 1990.
63Ibid.
^USDAFS, "Approved Fire Management Area Plans, Region I,” 
in Fuel Management Planning and Treatment Guide (n.p., n.d.), 
40-34.
65USDAFS, "Prescribed Natural Fire History, 1972-1992," 
January 1993.
CHAPTER IV
THE YELLOWSTONE BURN AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR FIRE MANAGEMENT
Not since the fires of 1934 has the northern Rockies 
witnessed such a fire season as the one Mother Nature 
provided in 1988. A total of 249 fires burned in the 
Greater Yellowstone Area. Fifty of these fires originated 
in the park and spread to neighboring national forests.1 Of 
the fifty fires, twenty-two were labeled wildfires, and 
twenty-eight were initially designated PNFs. Twelve of the 
PNFs burned out in less than one acre and the rest became 
wildfires2 because they were unwanted by park officials. Of 
the estimated 1.2 million acres which burned in the Greater 
Yellowstone Area, 800,000 acres burned in the park and a 
large majority of the rest on Forest Service lands.3
After these fires were declared wildfires, Park and 
Forest
]The six national forests in the Greater Yellowstone Area 
are the Beaverhead, Targhee, Bridger-Teton, Shoshone, 
Gallatin, and Custer Forests. One hundred and eighty fires 
began in these forest during the fire season of 1988. Grand 
Teton National Park, which is also a component of the Greater 
Yellowstone Area, contributed nineteen fires to the 249 total.
2Ronald H. Wakimoto, "The Yellowstone Fires of 1988: 
Natural Process and Natural Policy," Northwest Science 64, no. 
5 (1990): 242.
3Micah Morrison, Fire in Paradise: The Yellowstone Fires
and the Politics of Environmentalism (New York: Harper
Collins, 1993), 207. Of the nineteen fires in Grand Teton
National Park, 15 were either suppressed or burned out in 
under an acre. Wakimoto, "The Yellowstone Fires," 242.
73
74
Service personnel not only fought fire on their own lands, 
but together in and outside the park. The fires became so 
large that an Area Command center had to be setup to oversee 
the strategic operation of fire fighting. Troy Kurth, a 
forester from Northern Region headquarters, was selected to 
head the deployment of Area Command. He was responsible for 
coordinating fire suppression in the park and in the 
surrounding national forests.
When Kurth arrived on the scene 22 July 1988, no 
organization was in place. An attitude of mistrust had 
developed between the two services because of the lack of 
fire coordination in suppressing fires earlier in the 
season. The Park Service labeled some of its fires PNF and 
did not suppress them even though they would eventually 
spread onto Forest Service land. The Forest Service argued 
that if appropriate suppression action had been taken by the 
Park Service, the fires of 1988 would not have been as 
destructive on Forest Service land as they were.4
Park Service land and Forest Service wilderness areas 
are administered alike: management of the land is to be
left in the hands of natural forces so that it will appear 
"untrammeled" by man. Kurth's respect for the wilderness 
character of the park is reflected in his decision 
concerning what fire suppression methods to utilize. He 
authorized chain saws only where appropriate (in defense of
4Troy Kurth, interview with author, 29 October 1993.
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historic structures and homes). Kurth did not see the 
necessity of using bulldozers to cut fire lines. The fires 
were crowning and spotting,5 and the use of dozers would 
"not have made a difference in catching the fire." Kurth 
further justified this position by stating that there was 
"no economic value for putting the fire out in the park." 
That is, the fires were not burning any of the historical 
structures of the park, they were only considered a natural 
wilderness phenomena.6 Plus, tractor marks would remain 
visible for 100 to 200 years. Robert Barbee, the 
superintendent of Yellowstone, wanted the structures in the 
park to be saved, but he wanted the land to be managed as 
wilderness. Kurth agreed and, light-on-the-land-tactics 
fire suppression were the order of the day.7
Since the fires of 1988, there have been numerous 
critics of fire management programs of both the Forest and 
Park Service. Are any of these critics justified in their 
assumptions based solely on the fires of 1988, specifically
5A crown fire "is a fire that advances through the 
'canopy' of a forest." Spotting results from "a fire 
producing sparks or embers (fire brands) that are carried by 
the wind and which start new fires beyond the main fire 
perimeter." Walstad, Radosevich, and Sandberg, eds., Natural 
and Prescribed Fire. 302: 309.
6A11 of Yellowstone's structures were protected by fire 
fighters who fought the fires with foam, water and hand tools 
when they came in close proximity to the buildings' 
perimeters.
7Kurth, interview, 29 October 1993. Light-on-the-land- 
tactics are "fire fighting tactics thought to cause [the] 
least suppression damage." Morrison, Fire in Paradise. 235.
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those in Yellowstone? For the answer one must understand 
the historic background of the ecology of the area, and the 
role fire has played there.
The high plateaus which constitute most of Yellowstone 
Park were caused by ancient volcanic activity. Volcanic 
rocks produce soil of low productivity. As a result of this 
feature and "a cool moist climate, [the park is] largely 
covered by subalpine coniferous forests of lodgepole pine, 
subalpine fur, and Engleman spruce, with open meadows 
interspersed through the forest.1*8 The major mountain 
ranges in and around the park have the same terrain. The 
largest unforested area of Yellowstone is the northern 
range. This is "a mixed grassland/sageland region making up 
twenty percent of the park . . . .1,9
In the subalpine terrain the natural fire cycle is 
"300-400 years in which large areas burn during a short 
period, followed by a long, relatively fire-free period 
during which highly flammable fuels develop."10 These large
8William H, Romme and Don G. Despain, "The Long History 
of Fire in the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem," Western 
Wildlands 16 (Summer 1989): 10.
9Paul Schullery, "Yellowstone Fires: A Preliminary
Report," Northwest Science 63, no.l (1989): 199.
10William H. Romme, "Fire and Landscape Diversity in 
Subalpine Forests of Yellowstone National Park, " Ecological 
Monographs 52, no. 2 (1982): 199.
77
fires are high-intensity crown stand-replacement fires.11 
The natural fire regime is considerably shorter on the 
northern range. The normal interval for fire on the range 
is from 25-100 years.12 These fires can be either low- or 
high-intensity surface fires depending on the fuel 
accumulation between burn intervals.
Yellowstone Park, which began fire suppression 
operations in 1886 under Army administration, did not adopt 
the concept of fire management until 1972. So, for eighty- 
six years, fires had been suppressed in the Park. However, 
fire suppression techniques were not very effective until 
the mid-1930s. Critics of the 1988 fires believe that as a 
result of Yellowstone's previous commitment to fire control, 
unnatural quantities of fuel such as downed trees and 
undergrowth were allowed to build up in the park.13 Both, 
it can be argued, took away from the wilderness 
characteristic of the park. This hypothesis is false in the 
majority of Yellowstone. As the research biologist William
A. Romme writes, the natural fire interval in the subalpine 
forests, "rather than human fire suppression, apparently is
HStand-replacement fires are usually crown fires of high- 
intensity (extreme heat and size) which completely kill a 
tree. This type of fire allows new trees to grow where the 
dead trees stood.
12Schullery, "Yellowstone Fires, " 45.
13American Forestry Association, "Amending the Let-Burn 
Policy on Public Lands," Policy paper, (Washington, D.C.,
1988) .
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the major reason for the small number and size of the fires 
in the area during the last 180 years,"14 and the cause of 
the large fire in 1988. Nevertheless, it appears fire 
suppression on the northern range, at least, "has been 
underway long enough to have noticeable effects on plant 
communities."15 Therefore, according to scientific 
investigations, nearly eighty percent of the park (the 
subalpine region) has maintained a "natural" quality as 
defined by the term wilderness in respect to fire and its 
role in the ecosystem.
After the Yellowstone fires, the Departments of the 
Interior and Agriculture established the Fire Management 
Policy Review Team in September 1988. The team "was charged 
with reviewing the current policies governing national park 
and wilderness fire management . . . and recommending any
changes needed to correct problems encountered during the 
1988 fire season."16
The policy review team found that out of all the 
government agencies, the National Park Service's fire 
management plans did not meet current federal standards. 
Yellowstone was a "particularly bad example of this lack of
14Romme, "Fire and Landscape," 199. Romme reports that 
the last fire comparable to the 1988 burn occurred in the 
1700s.
15Schullery, "Yellowstone Fires," 45.
16Wakimoto, "The Yellowstone Fires," 239.
compliance to national fire policy."17 The team also 
discovered that the fire management plan used in 1988 had 
not been approved by Loraine Mintzmeyer, the Regional 
Director, Rocky Mountain Region, NPS, or the Superintendent 
of Yellowstone, Robert Barbee, as specified in NPS-18.18 In 
fact, the plan park officials presented to the review team 
was an approximate version, altered by Yellowstone 
personnel, of the 1986 fire management plan previously 
submitted by Stephen Pyne.19 A publication produced in 
October 1988 by the NPS, Yellowstone National Park, The 
Yellowstone Fires: A Primer on the 1988 Fire Season, stated 
that, "in 1986 a new revision of the plan— really just a 
refinement of earlier plan editions--was completed, and was 
in the final stages of approval as of the spring of 1988."20 
This does not appear to have been the actual situation in 
1988 .
The park was operating its fire management program 
according to the 1976 Yellowstone fire plan and had no hard 
scientific data on which to base a PNF policy.21 Some
17Ibid. , 240.
18Ibid.
19Stephen Pyne, letter to author, 16 April 1993.
20USDI, NPS, The Yellowstone Fires: A Primer on the 1988
Fire Season, n.p., 1 October 1988, 4.
21Wakimoto, interview, 8 March 1993. Kilgore also goes 
into some detail concerning the Yellowstone's fire management 
plan and its need for revision due to a lack of scientific 
data in "Fire Management Programs," 72. It is important to
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Yellowstone Park fire personnel were only "paper trained." 
That is, "they had taken fire management training courses 
but lacked actual fire experience along the various levels 
of command and responsibility."22 (After close scrutiny by 
the Fire Management Policy Review Team, the PNF policies and 
programs of the Sierra Nevada parks were found to be within 
current national policy standards.)
Since there was no scientific basis on which the park's 
PNF program was founded, and due to the fact that only 
lightning- caused fires were allowed to burn in natural fire 
management zones (Yellowstone did not incorporate human 
ignitions into its program), one could argue —  as some have 
—  that there was an unusually large quantity of ground fuel 
to feed the fires of 1988. However, the scientific evidence 
previously stated does not support this assertion.
Following the fires of '88, Romme and Don G. Despain, 
a Yellowstone research biologist, began a study to analyze 
tree-ring fire-scars to determine the fire history of the 
park.23 Using this investigating technique, the scientists 
found "three indications that fire behavior, in terms of 
heat release, flame height, and rate of spread, was similar
note that the Park Service did not begin using the NFDRS until 
1978, the same year the Forest Service felt confident enough 
in the system's reliability to begin a formal PNF program.
22Wakimoto, "The Yellowstone Fires," 241.
23A previous study by Romme in 19 8 0 determined the fire 
history of the park. See footnote number 10, Chapter IV.
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in 1988 and the 1700s.” In reference to previous fire 
suppression, they established that it "had some influence on 
the size and behavior of the fires in 1988, but these large 
fires were a result primarily of drought and wind 
conditions, as well as normal successional dynamics 
following the last major fires approximately 280 years ago." 
Thus, the researchers concluded "that the fires of 1988 
should not be viewed as an abnormal event."24
The Yellowstone fires of '88 challenged and threatened 
the idea of fire management in wilderness. If it had not 
been for a few men who held firm to their beliefs, the 
wilderness character of Yellowstone and the concept of fire 
management could have been severely damaged. The 
Yellowstone fires initiated a revision of fire management 
policy and programs in the Park and Forest Service. Even 
after investigation of the park's policy and program, Kurth 
supports its past fire management operations. The plans 
were not "perfect," but "at the time the decisions were 
made, there was not much information" on which to base a 
program. Fire management policy and programs have improved 
since the 1988 fires, But, as Kurth concludes, one "can't 
change the historical perspective [by] trying to justify
24William H. Romme and Don G. Despain, "Historical 
Perspective on the Yellowstone Fires of 1988: A
Reconstruction of Prehistoric Fire History Reveals that 
Comparable Fires Occurred in the Early 1700s," Bio Science 39 
(November 1989): 695-699.
decisions [prior to 1988] on today's knowledge."25
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The Public and the Yellowstone Fires
Like the park's previous fire management programs, the 
public's perception of the 1988 fires has changed as time 
has allowed for more understanding concerning the role of 
fire in Yellowstone's environment. Part of the problem with 
the public's early perception of the Yellowstone fires was 
that "the media did a mediocre job of reporting the 
fires."26 The public did not see the fires as part of an
ecological process, only as good or bad for the park. At
first there was "a wide gap between ecological reality and 
public understanding. 1,27 Through education, however,
visitors to the park and residents in the surrounding
communities began to view the fires in a positive manner 
within the context of a large natural phenomena. This 
phenomena, they learned, benefitted all of the flora and 
fauna species which inhabit the Greater Yellowstone 
Ecosystem. Thus, in time, attitudes changed and the fires
25Kurth, interview, 29 October 1993.
26John D. Varley and Paul Schullery, "Reality and 
Opportunity in the Yellowstone Fires of 1988," chap. in The
Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem:______Redefining America's
Wilderness Heritage, eds. Robert B. Keiter and Mark S. Boyce 
(New York: Vail-Ballou Press, 1991), 115.
27Ibid. , 118.
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of '88 began to be cast in a favorable light.
This new understanding concerning fire's role in 
Yellowstone's environment is likely to boost the number of 
tourists to the park. One study found that projected 
visitor levels for Yellowstone are likely to "remain the 
same or increase" in the future. The researchers attributed 
this trend to "potential visitors [who] do not view the fire 
damage as a large draw back, but rather an interesting 
ecological attraction."28
Prescribed Burning In Yellowstone?
Would prescribed burning have helped reduce the fuel 
levels which were present in 1988? This question too has 
been raised by critics of Yellowstone's fire management 
policies.29 Prescribed burning did not take place in 
Yellowstone prior to the '88 fire season.30 Fire management 
officials at the park encouraged natural fire and did not 
believe PB would be feasible due to the parks geological and
28David J. Snepenger, David L. Peterson and Jill L. Bench, 
"Projecting Visitation to Yellowstone National Park After the 
Fires of 1988," Journal of Travel Research 5 (Summer 1989): 
39.
29American Forestry Association, "Amending the Let-Burn 
Policy on Public Lands."
30Prescribed burning has not taken place in Yellowstone 
since the fires of 1988.
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environmental setting. However, after the 1988 fires, 
managers have been looking into using PB in the buffer zones 
that the great fire did not burn over. But cost, in terms 
of resource allocation, is an issue which must be dealt with 
first. Also, state permits must be issued for PB due to the 
Clean Air Act and the air quality concerns of nearby 
communities.31
As previous evidence has shown, PB in eighty percent of 
the park would not have been compatible with the idea of 
ecosystem management due to the historic fire regime of the 
park, and the fact that fire suppression over the past fifty 
odd years had not severely altered the wilderness 
characteristic of the park.32 Still, one would believe 
that PB could and should be utilized on the northern range 
because of its 25-100 year fire interval. According to Phil 
Perkins, Yellowstone's fire management officer, research PBs 
- have been attempted on the range, but the area would not 
burn due to overgrazing by the park's large elk 
population.33
It appears that PB would have helped improve the
3,Phil Perkins, interview with author, 2 June 1988. 
Perkins is the current Fire Management Officer of Yellowstone, 
and held the position in 1988.
32This explored in detail in Paul Schullery and
Don G. Despain, "Prescribed Burning in Yellowstone National 
Park: A Doubtful Proposition, 1 Western Wildlands 15 (Summer
1989): 30-34.
33Ibid.
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ecological balance of the northern range, but it is not an 
ecologically sound management tool for the vast subalpine 
territory of Yellowstone National Park. Following the 1988 
fires, all of the National Parks with fire management plans 
have included PB guidelines within them (the plans) whether 
or not they are used as an ecological tool for maintaining 
the wilderness conditions within each unit. The fires of 
1988 gave new life to PNF v. PB debate, a debate that is 
currently on going in the Forest Service.
The Natural v. Human Fire Controversy in the Forest Service
Not all wilderness ecosystems operate on the same fire
regime time line as Yellowstone. Region One of the Forest
Service is comprised of two dominant fire regimes. The
first are long-interval crown fires (perhaps 100-300 
years) in continuous forests of lodgepole pine mixed 
with spruce and fir; and [the second are] short- 
interval (5-60 years), low- to moderate-intensity 
surface fires in the lower elevation Douglas-fir, 
aspen, ponderosa pine stands, grassy parklands, and in 
adjacent open lodgepole stands.34
Because small fires burn in a mosaic pattern during
intervals between stand-replacement fires, some foresters
feel that PB should become an official tool in wilderness
34Bruce M. Kilgore, "Fire in Wilderness Ecosystems," chap. 
in John C. Hendee, Goerge H. Stankey and Robert C. Lucas, 
Wilderness Management. 2d. ed., rev. (Colorado: North
American Press, 1990), 322-323.
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management practice. Those who support this idea argue that 
PNFs do not occur frequently enough to return the wilderness 
to the way it was before viewed by Europeans. Few 
proponents of PB take into consideration past Native 
American burning practices, however; some supporters have 
given consideration to Indian fire and its relation to 
current fire management implications in their arguments for 
PB.35 After all, Native American fires are just a different 
category of PB, and both have the same desired result in the 
ecosystem.
As we have seen, fire has been scientifically proven to 
be an integral part of the ecological balance of a 
wilderness area. Nevertheless, some foresters believe that 
PNF programs should be augmented by manager-ignited fires 
(prescribed burning). Not all foresters agree. The main 
issue in this debate is whether prescribed burning should be 
allowed in wilderness and nonwilderness areas. Scientific 
papers have been written advocating prescribed burning and 
opposing it in both areas.36 However, most arguments on the 
subject revolve around personnel opinion mixed with
35See, Phillips, "The Relevance of Past indian Fires to 
Current Fire Management Programs," and Arno, "Ecological 
Effects and Management Implications of Indian Fires."
36William A. Worf opposes prescribed burning in his 
article "Wilderness Management: A Historical Perspective on
the Implications of Human-Ignited Fire." Bruce M. Kilgore 
supports prescribed fire in his article "Human-Ignited Fires 
in Wilderness: A Response to Bill Work." Both article are in
Symposium and Workshop on Wilderness Fire. 276-282: 283-289.
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scientific evidence.
Bud Moore believes that manager-ignited fires are "okay 
even in wilderness." He feels that it should not be done to 
enhance wildlife habitat but, to return the area to a 
natural state. This, he argues, needs to be done because 
"fire suppression in the past has caused the buildup of too 
much kindling for [adequate] fire protection." Further, 
Moore argues that if one is to use prescribed fire outside 
wilderness, one must take into consideration the possibility 
of the fire spreading to surrounding private land. He 
concludes that no matter what type of fire is permitted to 
burn, it should be "managed for the good of the forest."37
Another supporter of this type of fire is Robert 
Mutch. He asserts that prescribed burning should be used in 
"smaller wildernesses that don't lend themselves well to PNF 
as in larger wildernesses." The major problem with the 
argument is that some wilderness areas are too small to 
contain a natural blaze if there are not favorable weather 
conditions. He advocates the use of human-ignited fires 
"not for wildlife habitat or visual effect but, for the 
reduction of [fuels that cause] wildfires." However, Mutch 
points out that animals and plants have adapted to fire 
regimes over the years and, as is well known, some flora and 
fauna depend on fire for their survival.38
37Moore, interview , 16 October 1993.
38Mutch, interview, 5 November 1993.
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John Puckett does not agree with all of the arguments 
above. Puckett contends that no one can "make the 
determination [to use prescribed fire] with a degree of 
accuracy" because nature too missed stands of trees in her 
burn mosaic and allowed fuels to build up. Outside 
wilderness Puckett advocates the use of manager-ignited fire 
"when it best meets the needs" of the area.39
Each individual has his own viewpoint concerning the 
numerous aspects of this debate. Can nature tell the 
difference between these two types of fire in wilderness and 
nonwilderness areas? It seems the jury is still out, but 
both sides of the debate have arguments which support their 
cause.40
If fire managers in today's forests and parks are to 
continue their efforts to create and maintain a thriving 
forest environment like that which existed prior to the era 
of fire suppression, managers must consider using PB as an 
alternative to PNF in wilderness and nonwilderness alike.
As this paper demonstrates, natural fires do not occur 
frequently enough to counter balance the years of 
suppression. And, when they do ignite, they are not always 
allowed to burn due to management guidelines and social
39Puckett, interview, 28 October 1993.
40It should be noted that the Forest Service approved and 
began the use of prescribed fire in certain Florida wilderness 
areas and forests in the mid-1980s.
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restrictions.41 If fire is continually denied its role in 
both these areas, the ecological equilibrium of the two 
forest categories will continue to decay, and fire managers 
will only have that much more work to perform in the future.
Fire Management After 1988: The Forest Service
Once the smoke cleared in the fall of 1988, policy 
review teams set to work to study and upgrade the fire 
management policies of both the Forest and Park Service.
The Fire Management Policy Review Team, established jointly 
by the Departments of Agriculture and Interior, consisted of 
representatives from both departments as well as the 
academic community. In its review the team "began with the 
premise that [they] were to focus on fire management 
policies, not on the overall management direction of 
national parks and wilderness areas."42 The team concluded 
that " fire policies [were] sound, but implementation was 
not uniform among the different agencies."43 Forest Service 
plans fared much better in the investigation than did the 
Park Service's. It seemed as if the Forest Service's goals
4IThese restrictions will be discussed in the following 
two sections.
42Wakimoto, "The Yellowstone Fires," 239.
43Ibid. , 240.
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for wilderness fire management would escape change, but this
was not to happen. The team found that
the ecological effects of PNF support resource 
objectives, but the social and economic effects may be 
unacceptable in some cases. PNFs may affect permitted 
uses of. . . wilderness, such as recreation, and impact
outside areas through such phenomena as smoke and 
stream sedimentation.44
Its ecological intentions were sound, but now the Forest
Service had to take into account factors which it once gave
either low or no priority. The Prescribed Fire Management
Criteria Task Force, established by and for the Forest
Service, was already hard at work overhauling its (Forest
Service) policies to correspond with those put forth by the
Policy Review Team.
The Task Force, which comprised eight members from
different Forest Service regions, "found that, for the most
part direction and procedures for implementing a successful
prescribed natural fire program are already in place."45
The Task Force had several recommendations for upgrading PNF
programs. The first one stated that, "Forest Service Manual
[FSM] 5140 [the section on PNF] be revised to address the
requirements of a prescribed natural fire program."46 These
recommendations address those which were mentioned by the
Policy Review Team. The suggestions include understanding
44Ibid.
45USDAFS, Report of the Task Force on Prescribed Fire
Management (n.p., 20 May 1989), 1.
46Ibid.
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and planning for potential environmental, on/off site,
socio-economic, and political impacts of PNF plan
implementation.47 More specifically, the Task Force found
that PNF plans must contain
risk assessment that portrays the estimation of the 
possibilities and the consequences of the decision 
process using the following criteria as a minimum: 
threat to life and property; smoke management concerns; 
[and] impacts on visitors, users, cooperators and local 
communities, etc.48
The ecological impetus for PNF was not challenged. The Task
Force only recommended a more thorough and broader scope
plan in which the residual effects of PNF would be
calculated. The ecological necessity of fire stayed
intact.49
The suggestion of both review teams appear in the
latest FSM Amendment dated 12 September 1991. According to
Section 5140 of the FSM, each national forest fire
management plan must a have segment detailing
the risks involved and potential impacts of plan 
implementation (such impacts include political, 
socio/economic, on/off site, and environmental), 
including the trade-off between smoke emissions from 
prescribed natural fire and the ecological need to
47Ibid. , 15.
48Ibid. , 16.
49Referring back to the discussion on PNF v. PB, it is 
interesting to note that one of the recommendations of the 
Task Force called for the use of prescribed fire "within or 
adjacent to wilderness boundaries or inholdings where current 
fuel conditions and hazards prevent managers from utilizing 
PNF successfully." 6.
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burn.50
The objective of PNF use did not change. The 1991 amendment
stated that the objective is
to use prescribed fire, from either management 
ignitions or natural ignitions, in a safe, carefully 
controlled, cost-effective manner as a means of 
achieving management objectives defined in the Forest 
Plan.51
As is evidenced earlier in the paper, the main objective of 
PNF management programs is for the maintenance of the 
ecological balance of a wilderness area.
All of the wilderness areas within Region One do not 
currently have approved fire management plans.52 Fire 
managers are presently writing plans for areas without them, 
but until they are ready, suppression tactics are used 
against each fire. The outline of the plans may have 
changed after 1988; however, the idea that fire in a natural 
ecosystem "is as essential as the wind and the rain" did 
not.53
50USDAFS, Forest Service Manual 5100, 5140, amnd. 5100-91- 
10, (n.p., n.d.), 7 of 23.
51Ibid. , 3 of 23 .
520nly 6 wilderness areas have approved plans as of 29 
July 1993. Prior to 1988, Region one had 18 approved plans. 
4,535,040 wilderness acres and 19,840 nonwilderness acres are 
covered by approved plans. USDAFS, "Approved Fire Management 
Plan, Region 1," (n.d.), 40-34.
53Moore, "From Fire Control to Fire Management," 12.
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Fire Management After 1988: Yellowstone
In October of 1988, the Fire Management Policy Review 
Team suspended all National Park Service PNF programs until 
it determined that either current policies met federal 
regulations or, that newly composed plans, in those parks 
not having adequate PNF guidelines, were up to par. The 
programs in Yosemite, Sequoia, and Kings Canyon were 
reinstated in 1990. In Yellowstone, a new PNF program was 
put on-line in 1992.
The team's review included numerous recommendations in 
its final report of 5 May 1989. These recommendations 
strengthened current plans by:
A. Developing joint agency fire management plans, 
agreements, or addendums to existing plans for those 
areas where fires could cross administrative 
guidelines.
B. Including a comprehensive criteria which will be 
used in deciding whether or not to allow natural 
ignitions to burn as prescribed fires.54
The criteria recommended for allowing a fire to burn
included such scientific items as "energy release
components" in area fuels, "1000-hour fuel or duff moisture
content,"55 and "indicators of cumulative drought effects on
54USDI, Fire Management Policy Review Team, Final Report 
of the Fire Management Policy Review Team (n.p., 5 May 1989), 
1 .
55Duff is "the partly decayed organic matter on the forest 
floor." "Duff," Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary.
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fire behavior." Other recommendations included social or 
culture considerations such as a fire's "potential impact 
upon visitors, users, and local communities, both on and off 
site."
On the personnel side of the recommendations, the team 
advised that "agencies will ensure the availability of 
qualified staff and knowledgeable line officers for 
developing, implementing, and managing prescribed fire 
programs."
Further, the team suggested that "agencies . . . ensure
NEPA compliance for fire management plans," and also 
incorporate interpretation of relevant information to the 
public "before and during fires . . . .1,56
Most of these directives were aimed at Yellowstone; 
however, both the Secretaries of the Interior and 
Agriculture (as the above information has shown) approved 
the team's recommendations, and required them to be 
incorporated into the new fire plans that were written in 
both the Park Service and Forest Service following 1988.57
The basic tenets of the Park Service's fire policy did 
not change following the fires of 1988. The policy of the 
Park Service still maintained that "the presence or absence 
of natural fires within a given ecosystem is recognized as a
56USDI, Fire Management Policy Review Team, Final Report.
1-3 .
57USDI, "Department of the Interior News Release," June 1,
1989.
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potent factor stimulating, retarding or eliminating various
components of the ecosystems."58 With the Policy Reviews
Team's affirmation of the use of PNF as a viable tool in
maintaining an ecological balance in wilderness, the Park
Service, and individual parks, began to revise and rewrite
their policies and programs to incorporate the
recommendations of the team. As an examination of current
fire management plans will prove, the parks did just that.
Due to Yellowstone's lack of compliance with National
Park Service fire guidelines prior to the 1988 fire, it
incorporated the most changes in its fire management plan of
any national park or forest. Yellowstone's new plan allows
fire to play its ecological role in the park while 
protecting human life, developments, and cultural 
resources. The plan includes specific fire 
prescriptions, incorporates the use of manager-ignited 
prescribed fire in predetermined areas, and suppresses 
all fires declared wildfires.59
An outline of the park's new fire management policy 
objectives demonstrate that park officials incorporated all 
of the recommendations which the Fire Management Policy 
Review Team suggested. The policy objectives are as 
follows:
1. To protect human life, property, and designated 
resources.
2. To allow fire to play its ecological role in the
58USDI, NPS, Management Policies and Guidelines, 
(Washington, D.C., 1978), pp. IV-13, 14. The basic intentions 
of the plan have not changed. Its last revision was in 1988.
59USDI, NPS, Yellowstone National Park Wildland Fire 
Management Plan (n.p., March 1992), 9.
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park to the greatest extent possible through the use 
of appropriate management techniques.
3. To suppress wildfires in a safe, cost-effective, and 
environmentally sensitive manner commensurate with 
the values at risk.
4. To maintain an active fire prevention program.
5. To maintain a fully qualified fire management staff 
to implement the fire management plan.
6. To maintain an interpretive and public information 
program that will educate the public on the 
ecological role of fire in the park and provide 
daily fire danger and situation information.60
Yellowstone managers also went to great lengths to 
determine that the park's fire program conformed with 
environmental compliances put forth by the National 
Environment Policy Act. The plan details fire's effects on 
vegetation (the major types found in the park), wildlife, 
water quality, soil, and air quality (the plan also has a 
section concerning Air Quality/Smoke Management Guidelines). 
Managers outlined likely fire behavior in the different fuel 
types in Yellowstone and the responsibilities of all 
personnel involved in fire management.61
Interagency coordination is covered in the plan as 
well.62 In fact, there is a Greater Yellowstone Area 
Interagency Fire Management Planning and Coordination Guide 
which incorporates the six national forests and Yellowstone 
and Grand Teton National Parks into a cooperative agreement 
regarding management of PNF and wildfire on the different
60Ibid. , 16.
61Ibid. , 22-26, 37-42 .
62Ibid. , 43.
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service's lands.63
After three years of total fire suppression in the 
park, the plan written by the Yellowstone's resource and 
fire managers was approved, and once again, conditions were 
established whereby fire could return to its historic role 
in Yellowstone National Park.
Fire Management After 1988: The Sierra Nevada Parks
Like Yellowstone's fire management plan, Yosemite's 
plan is also very detailed.64 The plan describes policies, 
goals and objectives for managing fire according to National 
Park Service guidelines. The park's fire management program 
is divided into three fire-management zones. Zone one, 
which constitutes seventy-five percent of the park, allows 
PNF year-round. Zone two allows PNF part of the year, but 
is mainly a PB area. This zone constitutes eight percent of 
the park. Finally zone three, which accounts for the last 
seventeen percent of park acreage, is a complete fire 
suppression zone which constitutes the most developed and 
visitor frequented areas, and a thin stretch of boundary
63The Greater Yellowstone Coordinating Committee, The 
Greater Yellowstone Area Interagency Fire Management Planning 
and Coordination Guide (n.p., June 1990).
MIt is important to remember that Yosemite and 
Sequoia/Kings Canyon had, and still have, very active PB 
programs unlike Yellowstone.
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surrounding the entire park.65 In addition to PNF, PB is 
utilized in zones one and two in the hopes of reestablishing 
a natural fire regime. To help accomplish this objective, 
the plan details natural fire regimes according to the 
different vegetative communities that inhabit the park.66
Yosemite resource managers rewrote the fire management 
plan in accordance with the recommendations set forth by the 
Policy Review Team. Included in the revised plan are: 
detailed prescriptions for all zones concerning both PNF and 
PB, as well as daily certification requirements; cooperative 
agreements with the Forest Service; qualifications and 
training guidelines for fire management personnel; smoke 
management criteria; fuel model maps; and regulations 
regarding public information and interpretation concerning 
fire.67
As Ed Duncan, the Prescribed Fire Manager at Yosemite, 
said, the Yellowstone fires "displayed the magnitude of 
ecological change" a fire can have on an area, and it proved 
that fire for an ecosystem is completely positive. No 
matter what the changes are to NPS-18, the fires have given
65There is only a cooperative agreement regarding fire 
suppression with Sierra and Stanislaus National Forests which 
border Yosemite. There is no agreement regarding PNF moving 
across agencies boundaries. For this reason a quarter-mile- 
wide area surrounding the park is within the full suppression 
zone three.
66USDI, NPS, Fire Management Plan (Yosemite National Park, 
March 1990), 3-45a.
67Ibid.,52-60,6781, 91, 109, 121, 127, append. A.
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fire management a boost with more research funding and 
personnel.68
Sequoia and Kings Canyon National Parks' fire plans is 
comparable to Yosemite in that it is divided into three fire 
management zones;69 however, the parks' fire management 
policies and programs changed little following the 1988 
fires. The main change was in the certification process of 
declaring a natural fire a PNF or a wildfire, or continuing 
to manage a PB as such and making sure it had not exceeded 
prescription limits. The parks have also strengthened 
previous cooperative fire related agreements with 
neighboring forest service managers. Prior to 1988, the two 
services had always had a good relationship concerning joint 
suppression action, but after 1988, area national forests70 
began writing prescriptions for PNF into their fire plans, 
and now the two are trying to agree on a format for allowing
68Ed Duncan, interview with author, 27 May 1993.
69USDI, NPS, Fire Management Plan (Sequoia and Kings 
Canyon National Parks, rev., April 1984), 36-37. Zone three 
of the above plan is not a full suppression area like 
Yosemite, both PNF and PB are permitted under "restrictive 
conditions."
70The national forests which adjoin Sequoia/Kings Canyon 
are Sequoia, which encompasses the Jennie Lakes Wilderness 
Area, Inyo, which encompasses the John Muir Wilderness, and 
Sierra National Forests.
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single fires to burn across agency boundaries.71
Resource managers of the two California parks "continue 
to allow naturally occurring fires to burn unimpaired within 
the designated 706,800-acre Natural Fire Management Zone," 
and to continue to monitor "the effects of natural fire on 
vegetation, fisheries, wildlife, water quality, air quality, 
and other ecosystem components . . .  as needed."72
Prescribed burning has remained an integral part of 
fire management in the parks. The use of "prescribed 
burn[ing] to reduce fuel hazards in areas where fuel is 
unnaturally heavy and wildfire threatens park resources and 
human safety," continues to be standard operating 
procedure.73
These parks had long taken in more than just ecological
factors when devising their fire policies. Smoke from the
fires remained a concern due to the parks' location near the
Central Valley of California. The parks' policy regarding
smoke states that
Burn[ing is to be permitted] only during periods when 
smoke will be carried away from populated areas, 
preferably over these Parks where they can dissipate. .
. No burning will be done below an inversion layer or 
in the absence of suitable smoke dispersal. Smoke
71Mike Warren, interview with author, 20 May 1993. Warren 
is the Fire Management Officer for Sequoia/Kings Canyon. This 
decision process is underway every day that a fire burns.
72USDI, NPS, Natural Resource Plan (Sequoia and Kings
Canyon National Parks, rev., April 1984), 15.
73Ibid.
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management will be part of every prescription.74 
Even with all the planning, heavy smoke continues to be a 
problem with local communities and visitors. However, most 
visitors accept the idea of fire management in the park,75 
and the parks again have an active fire program which 
benefits the ecology of the area.
Is Wilderness Becoming More "Park-Like"?
With all the advancements in ecosystem management, and 
the constant revision of fire policies and programs to keep 
up with the new information, have the managers of America's 
national parks and forests been able to recreate that "park­
like" atmosphere of a "vignette of primitive America?" The 
answers differ from park to park, but are much the same in 
the Forest Service.
As the previous information has demonstrated, the 
Yellowstone fires of 1988 burned in accordance with the past 
fire history of the park. Thus, today Yellowstone's 
wilderness areas must resemble closely the forests of the 
area as they appeared to the Native Americans and early 
explorers of long ago.
Recreation of natural conditions in the wilderness
74Ibid.
75Warren, interview, 20 May 1993.
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areas of the Sierra Nevada parks is not as evident. With
the managerial and social constraints previously mentioned,
it is difficult for park fire managers to allow fire, either
natural or human-ignited, to play its complete role in the
ecosystem. As the Fire Management Plan for Yosemite stated:
Interfering with only a few fires out of several 
hundred natural ignitions may seem like a minor 
disruption of natural fire regimes, but if such a 
disruption results in a large percentage reduction in 
area burned (e.g. 20%-50%) within the context of the 
natural fire return interval, then there may be subtle 
but significant long-term changes in the ecosystem.
All elements must be present to truly restore a 
natural ecosystem, not just those elements that present 
no management problems. A natural process operating 
under significant artificial restrictions is no longer 
a natural process.76
Thus, the environmental conditions of the past may never be
recreated.
Forest service fire management personnel face the same 
constraints which are factors in the policies and programs 
of the park service. Even worse is that not every national 
forest wilderness area has a fire management program, and 
accordingly, all fires are suppressed regardless of origin. 
It is impossible to say when, or even if, the wilderness 
areas of America's forests will return to their natural 
conditions; however, fire managers continue to try.
Hence, following the 1988 fires, officials of the 
national Park and Forest Service rewrote their fire 
management plans to correspond to the recommendations of the
76USDI, NPS, Fire Management Plan (Yosemite National Park, 
March 1990), 90.
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review teams; however, both services' rationale for burning, 
to allow fire to play its historic role in the maintaining 
of a natural wilderness ecosystem, did not change. There 
were just more variables added to the fire management 
equation.
Hopefully, the fire management practices of the Forest 
and Park Service will not lead people back to believing that 
fire in wilderness is an evil because it may char or 
temporarily impair the majestic surroundings they worked so 
hard to buy for themselves. Nature always has a way of 
making itself a presence in the life of humankind— fire is 
no exception. If fire managers are not allowed to perform 
their duty, and settlements continue to encroach on our 
nations wildlands the houses of the southern California 
foothills will not be the only property "up in smoke." Fire 
managers must be permitted to continue their work so that 
the wild in wilderness will not escape its confines and 
wreak havoc in places society says it does not belong.
CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION: THE FLAME THAT WILL NOT GO OUT
No one knows for sure when the first fire blazed on the 
North American continent. Archeological evidence proves 
that fire has at least been an environmental phenomena for 
over 80 million years. It is impossible fur scientists to 
calculate the influence these fires had on determining the 
environmental characteristics of the time. However, 
researchers have been able to ascertain that Native American 
fire practices did indeed play a role in creating the 
natural environment as it was first viewed by Euroamericans. 
Early explorers and settlers believed most indigenous fire 
practices to be wasteful, but Indians used fire as they 
would any rudimentary tool. Nevertheless, the European 
ideal of fire as a villain of the forest spread throughout 
the United States as settlements sprawled across the land.
Euroamericans loathed fire for they thought it 
destroyed the natural resources of the environment.
However, they still used it in a controlled fashion to 
lessen the hardships of frontier life and to produce a 
desired environment in which crops and domesticated animals 
could grow and flourish.
Even after the National Parks and Forests were set 
aside from the public domain, fire maintained its sinister 
image. It continued to plague the lumber industry and rural
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towns. On the nontangible side, fire was accused of turning 
aesthetically pleasing views into charred moonscapes and 
ruining the outdoor recreation opportunities for the public 
at large.
For over ninety years in the Park Service, and seventy 
in the Forest Service, money and human resources have been 
pumped into each for the protection and battling of this 
evil. However, as the environmental movement began to pick 
up speed in the 1960s, research scientists began to question 
the ecological consequences of fire suppression in the newly 
created wilderness areas. Fire control did not coincide 
with the objectives put forth in the Wilderness Act. New 
scientific evidence proved that plants and animals depended 
on fire for regeneration and sustenance. Ecological 
sciences had finally come of age.
Coinciding with the advancements in ecological 
understanding, significant improvements in weather 
forecasting and fire behavior prediction allowed managers to 
begin experimenting with fire in these wilderness areas 
during the late 1960s early 1970s. As more research and 
test programs corresponded with management objectives, the 
Park and Forest Services formerly recognized the use of 
prescribed natural fire as an ecological necessity for 
natural regulation in wilderness. In some areas, the Park 
Service also utilized prescribed burning to meet its 
wilderness management objectives. Plans for prescribed
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natural fire and prescribed burning in the services were 
finalized and fire returned to the forest on a modest scale 
between 1968 and 1978.
The prescribed natural fire and prescribed burning 
policies and programs came under close scrutiny following 
the fire season of 1988. Review teams found Park and Forest 
Service programs in need of slight reworking, especially 
Yellowstone's, but overall, they found most to be on target. 
The ecological need for fire in wilderness had survived its 
greatest challenge. Revisions to fire polices were 
completed and new fire plans were approved one to three 
years following the 1988 fire season. All parks with 
wilderness areas presently have a fire management plan; 
however, Forest Service districts with wilderness areas 
within their boundaries continue to develop and improve fire 
management programs for their land.
As the rest of the world begins to understand fire's 
role clearly in the larger planetary ecosystem, research 
scientists continue to make advancements in better 
understanding the role of fire in the ecological balance of 
the forest. As the population grows and development reaches 
further into our nation's woodlands, fire managers have had 
to take into consideration much more than the ecological 
integrity of the forest. This can be seen in the newly- 
composed plans of the Park and Forest Service. What the 
future will hold for fire management policies and programs
is not clear due to the expansion of human settlements and 
the continuous evolution of scientific understanding. As 
the fire historian Stephen Pyne wrote, "One can accurately 
speak about fire only in conjunction with something else—  
fire and flora, fire and fauna, fire and earth, fire and 
water."1 Fire and humans too, must be spoken together, 
because humankind has the greatest influence on fire. It 
must not be forgotten that if we destroy the ecological 
balance of nature in wilderness, wilderness itself will be 
destroyed. Humans cannot recreate wilderness— fire must 
live on! The Park and Forest Service, which had the courage 
to adapt to the human events and scientific evidence in the 
past, must maintain and act on that same courage in the 
future.
‘Pyne, Fire in America. 530.
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